

## **THE JOURNAL OF SIERRA LEONE STUDIES – Volume 2 – Edition 1 – January 2013**

### **Editorial Panel**

Abdul Bangura, Howard University, John Birchall, Ade Daramy, David Francis, University of Bradford, Lansana Gberie, Dave Harris, School of Oriental and African Studies University of London, Philip Misevich, St John's University, New York, John Trotman.

### **Dedication**

I recently made contact with Professor John Hargreaves, who some of you will know was the last Editor of this Journal. He was delighted to hear of its re-appearance and so we have dedicated this edition to John and thank him for his scholarship and dedication to the academic life of Sierra Leone.

In this edition

Monetary Policy and the Balance of Payments: Econometric Evidence from Sierra Leone - Samuel Braima, Head of Economics Department, Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone and Robert Dauda Korsu, Senior Economist, West African Monetary Agency.

Addressing Organised Crime in Sierra Leone: The Role of the Security-Development Nexus - Sacha Jespersen, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Book Review

A Critique of Epistemologies of African Conflicts: Violence, Evolutionism and the War in Sierra Leone (New York: Palgrave, 2012) - Lans Gberie

### **A new section**

We are pleased to introduce an end section that focuses on issues that will be of interest to those currently studying Sierra Leone and those who will follow this generation.

In this edition we have:

The naming of Sierra Leone - Peter Andersen

Edward Hyde, Murray Town - pilot in The Battle of Britain.

The chase for Bai Bureh - The London Gazette, 29th December, 1899.

### **Peer Reviewed Section**

In this edition we have included a range of different articles. Within the 'peer-reviewed' section we have our first article written by academics working in Sierra Leone, at Fourah Bay College. It focuses on macroeconomics and will be of interest to those working of the development of Sierra Leone

### **MONETARY POLICY AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE FROM SIERRA LEONE**

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#### ***ABSTRACT***

*The objective of the study was to test whether the balance of payments of Sierra Leone is a monetary phenomenon, using aggregate annual data for Sierra Leone from 1970 to 2010. A reserve flow model was estimated. Due to the inherent tendency of non-stationarity of macroeconomic variables and their attendant spurious effects on time series regression estimates, tests for stationarity of the variables were carried out. Given the existence of non-stationarity in the variables, which were however found to be stationary under linear combination ( are cointegrated), an error correction model was estimated. The result shows that the balance of payments of Sierra Leone is a monetary phenomenon, driven by changes in domestic credit, the price level, exchange rate and interest rate. Domestic credit, interest rate and the price level have negative effects on the balance of payments of Sierra Leone while the exchange rate has a positive effect. However, the importance of the price level is felt with a delayed impact.*

*The policy implication of this is that monetary policy operations that are consistent with low and stable inflation, domestic credit restraint and exchange rate depreciation are important for improvement of the balance of payments of Sierra Leone, with low and stable inflation being more useful for medium term objective.*

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Both internal and external balances are important to every economy. While internal balance is often and simply considered to be having low and stable inflation as well as sustained economic growth, external balance is about healthy balance of payments, which is a summary account for the external sector. The performance on the external balance of Sierra Leone has been poor since the 1970s, balance of payments problems is persistent.

Real GDP of Sierra Leone grew by 2.69 % in the 1970s, in the 1980s it grew by approximately 1.33 % and declined by -4.27 % from 1991 to 2000-the war period- ( See Table 1). Over the period 2001 to 2005 real GDP growth was 6.31 % and it grew by 6.00 % over the period 2006 to 2009. The improvement in the growth of the economy in the post-war period is not surprising since a more politically stable environment is attractive to investors. Inflation rate was 10.82 % in the 1970s, rose to 67.31 % in the 1980s, decreased to only 34.75 % over the period 1991 and 2000. It decreased further to 6.53 % over the period 2001 to 2005 though it increased over the period 2006 to 2009, standing at 10.20 %. The low level of inflation rate recorded over the period 2001-2005 could be attributed to the increase in the growth of real output ( the phenomenon of supply side factor), decrease in monetary growth and the decrease in depreciation of the exchange rate. However, with lower monetary growth over the period 2006-2009 the rate of inflation was higher in this period than the period 2001-2006. Budget deficit as a ratio of GDP was also lower in this period than the period 2001-2005, suggesting that fiscal control and monetary factors did not play role in higher inflation rates of the 2006-2009 period.

Despite the improved economic performance, with increasing real GDP growth and decrease in the rate of inflation in the post-war period (2001 to 2009), the external sector performance was worse than it was from the 1970s to the 1990s. External balance on goods and services was -4.02 % of GDP in the 1970s, improved to -2.89 % in the 1980s though still in deficit, declined to -

1.02 % from 1991 to 2000 (the war period) and deteriorated further to -30.23 % from 2001 to 2005 and stood at -24.65 % from 2006-2009.

**Table 1: Basic Macroeconomic Indicators for the Sierra Leonean Economy**

	1970-1979	1980-1990	1991-2000 (WAR PERIOD)	2001-2005	2006-2009
<b>*Real GDP Growth (%)</b>	2.69	1.33	-4.27	6.31	6.00
<b>CPI Inflation (%)</b>	10.82	67.31	34.75	6.53	10.20
<b>Export of Goods and Services (% of GDP)</b>	26.67	19.74	20.13	14.13	14.33
<b>Import of Goods and Services (% of GDP)</b>	30.69	22.63	21.16	44.36	38.98
<b>External Balance on Goods and services (% of GDP)</b>	-4.02	-2.89	-1.02	-30.23	-24.65
<b>Foreign Reserves, minus gold (Millions of U.S dollars)</b>	39.91	11.48	33.04	99.65	286.92
<b>Net Foreign Assets ( Millions of Leones)</b>	4.93	-11651.32	-273507.20	-211860.64	785659.60
<b>*External Debt (Millions of U.S dollars)</b>	210.98	808.31	1330.82	1598.61	863.2
<b>*Budget Deficit (% of GDP)</b>	6.34	10.27	10.69	13.44	9.1
<b>M1 Growth</b>	15.32	56.53	27.71	25.02	22.10
<b>M2 Growth</b>	17.14	51.77	29.77	27.31	24.00

Source:\* Calculated from *World Development Indicators* CD-ROM (2010)  
 Calculated from *International Financial Statistics* CD-ROM (2010)

Export of goods and services was 26.67 % of GDP in the 1970s, declined to 19.74% of GDP in the 1980s, further declined to 20.13 % from 1991 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2005 it decreased to 14.13 % resting at 14.33 % over the period 2006-2009. This is a reflection of export performance deteriorating since the 1970s. Import of goods and services as a percentage of GDP was higher than export of goods and services (as a percentage of GDP) for the periods 1970-1979, 1980-1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-2009. Import of goods and services declined from 30.69 % of GDP in the 1970s to 22.63 % in the 1980s, increased to 21.166 % from 1991 to 2000 and further increased to 44.36 % of GDP from 2001 to 2005 and it was 38.98 % over the period 2006-2009. As expected, the fall in exports and growing imports over the years deteriorated the external balance on goods and services.

Foreign reserves which fell from 39.91 millions of U.S dollars in the 1970s to 11.48 millions of U.S dollars in the 1980s rose to 33.04 millions of U.S dollars over the period 1991 to 2000, and further rose to 99.65 millions of U.S dollars from 2001 to 2005. Foreign reserves stood at 286.92 over the period 2006-2009. Net foreign assets which was positive in the 1970s, decreased to negative values over the periods 1980 to 1990, 1991 to 2000 and 2001 to 2005 with the worst case being during the period 1991 to 2000, followed by the period 2001 to 2005 and was positive over the period 2006-2009. External debt was on the increase, until 2007, with the period 2006-2009 recording lower external debt, which is not unconnected to the country's debt forgiveness of 2007.

Monetary restraint, which flows from the monetary approach to the balance of payments, is one of the main policy prescriptions given by the IMF. Based on the framework of the monetary approach to the balance of payments, monetary restraint is often recommended among others as a way to address poor performance on the balance of payments of the developing economies. To the extent that most sub-Sahara African economies including Sierra Leone are normally on the poor performance side of the balance of payments, they are often the recipients of this prescription. In Sierra Leone, monetary growth has been high, in addition to poor performance on the balance of payments. This could imply that balance of payments is a monetary phenomenon, which is however an empirical issue. Thus, whether balance of payments deficit emanates from monetary phenomenon is an issue worthy of investigation.

Information on the role of monetary phenomenon in the determination of the balance of payments can provide guiding principles to policy makers, especially monetary authorities, in respect of formulating policies for balance of payments adjustment. The objective of this paper is therefore to determine the role of monetary policy on the balance of payments of Sierra Leone.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theories of balance of payments. Section 3 is the Theoretical Framework and Methodology. Section 4 discusses the Estimation Results and Section 5 gives the Conclusion.

## 2. THEORIES OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

The theoretical literature on balance of payments adjustment falls into two: the traditional and modern theories. The traditional theories concentrate on the effect of the exchange rate on the balance of payments, ignore the capital account and net income from abroad and therefore consider the current account as the balance of payments. These include the absorption approach elasticity approach, the income approach, and the Lausen Metzler synthesis.

The elasticity approach (also referred to as the relative-price approach) proposed by Bickerdike (1920), Robinson (1947) and Metzler (1948) is the earliest among the channels that explain the effect of exchange rate on the balance of payments. It posits that an increase in the nominal exchange rate (called devaluation in a fixed exchange rate regime and depreciation in a floating exchange rate regime) increases exports and decreases imports, hence the current account improves. This emanates from the following: first, exports (domestically produced goods) become cheaper for foreign residents. Second, imports become more expensive relative to domestic goods. In a more simplistic context, this is referred to as the Marshall-Lerner condition, which states that from a point of zero trade balance, devaluation improves the trade balance if the sum of export and import elasticities of demand with respect to the exchange rate is greater than one.

The income/multiplier approach to the balance of payments resolves the failure of the elasticity approach to capture the income effect of an improvement in the trade balance following nominal exchange rate depreciation. According to the income approach, currency devaluation increases income by changing relative price. Hence, aggregate demand increases. The increase in aggregate demand increases income. But the increase in income increases imports. This increase in imports (the second round effect on imports) deteriorates the trade balance. The net effect of the devaluation on the balance of payments is therefore unknown since the trade balance increases initially but decreases in the second round. This is different from the J curve effect, which is the case when devaluation initially worsens the trade balance and improves it later. The J curve effect is associated with the relative price approach as it is possible for the trade balance to deteriorate initially and improve later due to the delayed effect of devaluation. The conclusion

is that if the income effect of devaluation is taken into account, an increase in the nominal exchange rate will improve the trade balance if the marginal propensity to spend on domestic output by residents must be less than one<sup>1</sup>. Gandolfo (1987) gives a detailed explanation and derivation of this condition. Hence even if the Marshall–Lerner condition is satisfied devaluation does not necessarily improve the trade balance once income effect is taken into consideration.

The absorption approach (Alexander, 1952) examines the effects of an increase in the nominal exchange rate by considering the relative effects of an increase in the exchange rate on income and absorption. The absorption approach maintains that devaluation or depreciation of domestic currency improves the trade balance if it increases income more than it increases absorption, if it reduces absorption more than it reduces income or if it increases income and reduces absorption. The effect on absorption occurs through increase in spending, which arises from the increase in income that follows devaluation (this is referred to as the indirect effect of devaluation or depreciation on absorption). The effect of devaluation on absorption also occurs through increase in prices, which affects absorption directly via the real balance effect or the money illusion effect (this is referred to as the direct effect as it affects absorption not through change in income). The absorption approach, as in the cases of the relative-price and income approaches maintains that the effect of devaluation on the trade balance is ambiguous. This is because both the qualitative and quantitative impact of a change in the nominal exchange rate on both income (through the idle resource effect and the terms of trade effect)<sup>2</sup> and absorption (through the direct effect and indirect effects)<sup>3</sup> are unknown.

The monetary approach to the balance of payments (IMF 1977, Johnson 1972 and Polak, 1957), which is a modern approach, considers the balance of payments from a broad perspectives rather

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal propensity to spend on domestic output by residents is the sum of the marginal propensity to consume and the marginal propensity to invest minus the marginal propensity to import.

<sup>2</sup> The idle resource channel says that if there are unemployed resources in the economy an increase in the exchange rate shifts expenditure from foreign goods to domestic goods. The resulting increase in aggregate demand will lead to an increase in income. The terms of trade channel says that if the devaluation improves the terms of trade, real income will increase but if it deteriorates the terms of trade, then real income will fall.

<sup>3</sup> The indirect effect of an increase in the exchange rate on absorption says that an increase in the nominal exchange rate changes income and absorption then changes in the same direction as the change in income. The direct effect refers to the fact that as the nominal exchange rate changes absorption can change through a channel different from the change in income: for example, through the real balance ( which is always negative for a rise in the exchange rate ) effect or money illusion effect ( which is always positive for a rise in the exchange rate).

than taking it as the current account balance. The propositions of this approach are: (i) the effect of the exchange rate on the balance of payments is temporary, in the long run an exchange rate variation does not affect the balance of payments as the monetary implication of the balance of payments nullifies any improvement from exchange rate depreciation. (ii) the balance of payments position changes as a result of factors that cause disequilibrium in the money market and domestic credit changes one for one in opposite direction with the balance of payments.

### 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for the study draws from the monetary approach to the balance of payments (MABP). This choice is out of the fact that it is the only theory of the balance of payments that recognizes the role of the money market in balance of payments adjustment. Hence it links the money market behaviour to the balance of payments. The MABP argues that disequilibrium in the balance of payments is a monetary phenomenon and not a real phenomenon. That is, balance of payments disequilibrium emanates from disequilibrium in the money market. The MABP specifies a money supply identity, money demand function and uses an equilibrium condition in the money market to derive a reserve-flow equation in which the coefficient of domestic component of money supply is expected to be minus one. The structure of the model is as follows.

$$M^d = f(Y, P, i) \quad (1)$$

$$M^s \equiv h \times H \quad (2)$$

$$H = FR + DC \quad (3)$$

$$M^d = M^s \quad (4)$$

Where:  $M^d$  is demand for money,  $Y$  is real income,  $P$  is price level,  $i$  is nominal interest rate,  $M^s$  is money supply,  $h$  is money multiplier,  $H$  is high powered money,  $FR$  is International Reserve and  $DC$  is domestic credit.

Equation (1) is the demand for money function, equation (2) is the money supply identity, equation (3) is the high-powered money and equation (4) is the equilibrium condition in the money market.



Substituting (3) into (2) gives  $M^s = h \times (FR+DC)$  (5).

From equation 5 we have :  $h^{-1} \times M^s = (FR+DC)$  (6)

Substituting (1) and (6) in (4) gives:

$$h^{-1} \times f(Y, P, i) = FR + DC \quad (7)$$

With a stable money multiplier and expressing (7) in flow terms and solving for change in reserve gives the fundamental equation of the monetary approach to the balance of payments, given in equation (8). It states that balance of payments disequilibrium is the result of divergence between growth of money demand and growth of domestic credit and the domestic component of money supply is related one-for-one in opposite direction with the balance of payments.

$$\Delta FR = h^{-1} \times \Delta f(Y, P, i) - \Delta DC \quad (8)$$

## 3.2 Methodology

### 3.2.1 The Model

The estimated model follows Mussa (1974), Dhliwayo (1996) and Adamu (2004). The inclusion of nominal exchange rate in the model is important on the basis that a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate encourages economic agents to sell foreign currency so that they make gain, in domestic currency. This increases the demand for (domestic) money and according to the monetary approach to the balance of payments, this is expected to improve the balance of payments. The sign of the coefficient of the nominal exchange here is consistent with the elasticity view of the balance of payments though the elasticity view focuses on the goods market and considers the trade balance as the balance of payments.

In linear form, the model estimated is given in equation (9).

$$\text{LnFR}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Ln DC}_t + \beta_2 \text{LnP}_t + \beta_3 \text{Lni}_t + \beta_4 \text{LnY}_t + \beta_5 \text{Lne}_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (9)$$

$$\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3 < 0 \text{ and } \beta_4, \beta_5 > 0$$

Where  $e$  = the nominal exchange rate,  $\varepsilon$  = white noise disturbance term,  $\ln$  = natural logarithm = time subscript and all other variables are defined as earlier.

### **3.2.2 Estimation Procedure**

Many macroeconomic variables have unit root and this leads to misleading results when Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used to estimate a model in the levels of the variables. One approach to correct this problem has been the application of OLS to the differences of the variables. However, this leads to loss of information about the long run. Therefore, testing for co-integration and consequently estimating an error correction model (ECM) in case of co-integration is the well celebrated approach. This follows from the Granger representation theorem of Engle and Granger (1987). In testing for co-integration, the Engle-Granger two-step (EGTS) procedure and the Johansen Maximum Likelihood procedure are the two methods mostly used in applied econometrics. However, the Johnson technique tests for the number of co-integrating relationship while the EGTS assumes there is only one co-integrating relationship, if there is co-integration. Moreover, the approach of the former is preceded by estimating a vector auto regression (VAR), which considers all variables to be endogenous.

This study applies the Dickey Fuller GLS and the Ng-Perron tests in order to test for the existence of unit root in each of the variables and the Johansen Maximum Likelihood procedure is used to test for the existence of co-integration among the foreign reserve and its determinants.

### **3.2.3 Data description and sources**

Aggregate annual data from 1970 to 2010 are obtained from the International Financial Statistics CD-ROM 2010. Foreign reserve is the international reserve excluding gold. Domestic credit is the sum of net claims on government and the private sector by the monetary sector. Income is real gross domestic product, which is gross domestic product at constant prices (2000 prices). The price level is the consumer price index with 2000 as the base year. The interest rate is the nominal deposit rate and the exchange rate is the end period nominal exchange rate defined as Leones per United States dollar.

## 4. ESTIMATION RESULTS

### 4.1 Order of Integration and Co-integration Tests

In order to determine the time series properties of the variables of the model (so that we could determine whether the estimation of the reserve-flow model should be done in the levels of the variables) each of the variables was tested for stationarity. The Elliott Rothenberg-Stock Dickey-Fuller (DF)-GLS and Ng-Perron tests were applied with drift and with both drift and trend. The use of these methods rested on the fact that the former outperforms the conventional DF test in terms of sample size and power<sup>4</sup> and the latter accounts for structural break as well as small sample size, thereby outperforming the original Phillips-Perron test.

The result shows that all the variables have unit root. Their first differences were therefore consequently tested for unit root. The results show that the first difference of each of the variables is stationary. Hence, each of the variables is integrated of order one. Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the unit root tests.

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<sup>4</sup> It works by applying GLS detrending to the series before running the auxiliary regression for the traditional DF test.

**Table 2: Results of the order of integration test using the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock**

**Dickey Fuller (DF)-GLS test**

Variable	Auxiliary Regression Contains	Dickey-Fuller GLS Statistics Lag 0	Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) GLS Statistics		Implication
			Lag 1	Lag 2	
<b>LnFR</b>	Drift	1.8898	2.0743	1.3362	LnFR ~I(1)
	Drift and Trend	0.0192	-0.0295	-0.2857	
<b>ΔLnFR</b>	Drift	-6.0074**	-0.6690	-0.0571	
	Drift and Trend	-7.5400**	-2.2233	-1.8581	
<b>LnDC</b>	Drift	0.0360	0.2550	0.2168	LnDC~I(1)
	Drift and Trend	-2.1840	-1.5411	-1.3796	
<b>ΔLnDC</b>	Drift	-8.3879*	-5.3625*	-4.1140**	
	Drift and Trend	-8.3988**	-5.3775**	-4.1366**	
<b>LnY</b>	Drift	0.1277	-0.6380	-1.4052	LnY ~ I(1)
	Drift and Trend	-0.8459	-1.3629	-1.9445	
<b>ΔLnY</b>	Drift	-4.7222**	-2.8645**	-2.3945*	
	Drift and Trend	-4.8080**	-2.9284	-2.4617	
<b>LnP</b>	Drift	1.2522	-0.0230	-0.4806	LnP ~ I(1)
	Drift and Trend	-0.5899	-1.2366	-1.6521	
<b>ΔLnP</b>	Drift	-3.2580**	-2.1311	-1.6306	
	Drift and Trend	-3.4989*	-2.3180	-1.7958	
<b>LnI</b>	Drift	-1.6168	-1.5722	-1.2317	LnI ~ I(1)
	Drift and Trend	-2.2333	-2.3919	-1.8573	
<b>ΔLnI</b>	Drift	-6.3007**	-5.5577**	-4.3766**	
	Drift and Trend	-6.2476**	-5.4699**	-4.2675**	
<b>LnE</b>	Drift	2.2534	2.3780	1.5174	LnE ~I(1)
	Drift and Trend	-0.6430	-0.3592	-0.4644	
<b>ΔLnE</b>	Drift	-6.9910**	-2.4907	-2.3062	
	Drift and Trend	-9.1639**	-4.2402**	-4.6689**	
<b>Critical Values</b>					
	Constant		Constant and Trend		
1 %	-2.6256		-3.7700		
5 %	-1.9496		-3.1900		
10 %	-1.6116		-2.8900		

Note: \*\*\* means the variable is stationary at 1% and \*\* means the variable is stationary at 5% level of significance.

**Table 3: Results of the order of integration test using the Ng-Perron test**

Variable	Auxiliary Regression Contains	Ng-Perron Statistics						Implication
		Lag 0		Lag 1		Lag 2		
		MZ(a)	Mz(t)	MZ(a)	Mz(t)	MZ(a)	Mz(t)	
LnFR	Drift	-0.6537	-0.2789	-0.8535	-0.2789	-2.0955	-0.7241	LnFR ~I(1)
	Drift and Trend	-2.4034	-0.9162	-2.4647	-0.9313	-4.4205	-1.3380	
ΔLnFR	Drift	-19.4617**	-3.1194**	-14.9983**	-2.7384**	-15.5066**	-2.7844**	
	Drift and Trend	-19.1419**	-3.0847**	-17.4021**	-2.9404**	-26.0986**	-3.6047**	
LnDC	Drift	0.5344	0.4290	0.7513	0.7105	0.6582	0.5763	LnDC~I(1)
	Drift and Trend	-8.1184	-1.9540	-5.3473	-1.5620	-5.1380	-1.5284	
ΔLnDC	Drift	-17.7133**	-2.9634**	-22.5636**	-3.3477**	-64.3789*	-5.6669*	
	Drift and Trend	-17.6977**	-2.9619**	-22.6363**	-3.3529**	-67.6915**	-5.8114**	
LnY	Drift	2.6667	1.3410	0.5303	0.8149	-6.8840	-1.4336	LnY ~ I(1)
	Drift and Trend	-0.8430	-0.3871	-3.4054	-1.0841	-10.9812	-2.1954	
ΔLnY	Drift	17.7985**	-2.9573**	-10.3394*	-2.2401*	-6.6433	-1.7811	
	Drift and Trend	-18.3002**	-3.0177*	-11.4774	-2.3865	-7.8167	-1.9659	
LnP	Drift	1.0823	1.9612	0.1313	0.0884	-1.7893	-0.7276	LnP ~ I(1)
	Drift and Trend	-0.8831	-0.5029	-4.4294	-1.3885	9.4958	-2.1071	
ΔLnP	Drift	-13.0990*	-2.5592*	-7.5257	-1.9397	-4.8043	-2.1071	
	Drift and Trend	-14.0370	-2.6442	-8.4740	-2.0519	-5.5390	-1.6561	
Lni	Drift	-4.3990	-1.4392	-4.7083	-1.4920	-3.0015	-1.1705	Lni ~ I(1)
	Drift and Trend	-8.8061	-2.0544	-11.6979	-2.3800	-8.3193	-1.9944	
ΔLni	Drift	-19.4612**	-3.0641**	-34.8457	-4.1322	-69.1712	-5.8510	
	Drift and Trend	-19.4818**	-3.0718**	-34.0041**	-4.0857**	-59.4993**	-5.4257**	
Lne	Drift	0.8648	1.1036	0.6278	0.6019	0.1300	0.0900	Lne ~I(1)
	Drift and Trend	-2.5454	-1.0410	-3.3155	-1.2091	-5.4489	-1.5872	
Δ Lne	Drift	-19.0373**	-3.0849**	-13.0272*	-2.5521*	-6.8436	-1.8498	
	Drift and Trend	-19.2511*	-3.0976*	14.3851	-2.6762	-7.9686	-1.9885	
<b>Critical Values</b>								
		Constant		Constant and Trend				
	1 %	MZ(a)	MZ(t)	MZ(a)	MZ(t)			
	5 %	-13.8000	-2.5800	-23.8000	-3.4200			
	10 %	-8.1000	-1.9800	-17.3000	-2.9100			
		-5.7000	-1.6200	-14.2000	-2.6200			

Note: ‘\*\*\*’ means the variable is stationary at 1% and ‘\*\*’ means the variable is stationary at 5% level of significance.

To the extent that each of the variables is not stationary in level but is stationary after first differencing (has unit root), co-integration test was carried out in order to determine whether a linear combination of them is stationary. When a linear combination of variables that are not stationary individually is stationary, there is co-integration among the variables ( which implies there is a long run relationship among the variables). The Johanson Maximum

Likelihood procedure for co-integration test was applied as it tests for both existence and the number of co-integrating relationships.

Table 4 shows the results of the co-integration test. The result shows that there are two co-integrating vectors based on the trace statistics and one co-integrating vector based on the Max-eigen value statistics. Since the ordering of the variables in the test starts with foreign reserves, the first co-integrating vector therefore reveals the reserve-flow co-integrating vector.

**Table 4: The result of the co-integration test**

Series: LNFR LNP LNRGDP LNDC LNE LNTBR				
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 2				
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)				
Hypothesized No. of CE(s)	Eigenvalue	Trace Statistic	0.05 Critical Value	Prob.**
None *	0.716585	119.6168	95.75366	0.0004
At most 1 *	0.562622	71.70480	69.81889	0.0351
At most 2	0.436784	40.28039	47.85613	0.2126
At most 3	0.269160	18.46486	29.79707	0.5319
At most 4	0.155864	6.549558	15.49471	0.6305
At most 5	0.002911	0.110763	3.841466	0.7393
Trace test indicates 2 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level				
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level				
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values				
Unrestricted Co-integration Rank Test (Maximum Eigen value)				
Hypothesized No. of CE(s)	Eigen value	Max-Eigen Statistic	0.05 Critical Value	Prob.**
None *	0.716585	47.91204	40.07757	0.0054
At most 1	0.562622	31.42441	33.87687	0.0954
At most 2	0.436784	21.81553	27.58434	0.2300
At most 3	0.269160	11.91530	21.13162	0.5561
At most 4	0.155864	6.438795	14.26460	0.5576
At most 5	0.002911	0.110763	3.841466	0.7393
Max-eigen value test indicates 1 co-integrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level				
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level				
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values				

### 4.3 The Parsimonious Error Correction Model

When non-stationary variables are found to be co-integrated with one co-integrating relationship, the conventional wisdom is to estimate an error correction model<sup>5</sup> (Engle and Granger, 1987). This shows the short run response of the endogenous variable to changes in the explanatory variables. It includes the speed of adjustment to equilibrium in a given period when the short run value of the endogenous variable deviates from the long run value. For an I(1) vector of variables, this is estimated by regressing the first difference of the dependent variable on the first differences of the explanatory variables, their lagged values and a lagged value of the residuals from the co-integrating relationship. The insignificant variables of the over-parameterised model are consequently dropped until the parsimonious model (also called the error correction model) of the short-run dynamics is obtained. This approach is applied here and the error correction model was obtained. Table 5 shows the over-parameterised model while Table 6 shows the parsimonious error correction model.

The over-parametised model shows that only the second lags of the price level, interest rate and the balance of payments are significant in determining the balance of payments. Suggesting the importance of lags in balance of payments adjustment. The parsimonious model was therefore obtained by dropping insignificant variables, in the spirit of the Hendry's general-to-specific modelling framework.

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<sup>5</sup> In the case of more than one cointegrating relationships, a vector error correction model is estimated.

**Table 5: The Overparametised Model of Balance of Payments**

Dependent Variable: DLNFR				
Method: Least Squares				
Sample (adjusted): 1973 2010				
Included observations: 38 after adjustments				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.476524	0.221728	2.149137	0.0447
$\Delta$ LnDC	-0.207325	0.121302	-1.709173	0.1037
$\Delta$ LnP	-0.368468	0.562474	-0.655084	0.5203
$\Delta$ Lni	-0.481051	0.305337	-1.575477	0.1317
$\Delta$ LnY	-0.013409	1.085326	-0.012355	0.9903
$\Delta$ Lne	0.255615	0.278585	0.917550	0.3704
$\Delta$ LnFr(-1)	0.514612	0.315916	1.628951	0.1198
$\Delta$ LnP(-1)	-0.679585	0.614873	-1.105244	0.2829
$\Delta$ LnDC(-1)	0.120271	0.134799	0.892223	0.3834
$\Delta$ Lni(-1)	0.387887	0.326982	1.186263	0.2501
$\Delta$ LnY(-1)	-1.093004	1.118555	-0.977157	0.3408
$\Delta$ Lne(-1)	0.274828	0.387297	0.709604	0.4866
$\Delta$ LnFr(-2)	0.450400	0.259953	1.732623	0.0994
$\Delta$ LnDC(-2)	0.075459	0.135293	0.557743	0.5835
$\Delta$ Lni(-2)	0.627501	0.261783	2.397024	0.0270
$\Delta$ LnY(-2)	-0.425480	1.081570	-0.393391	0.6984
$\Delta$ Lne(-2)	0.232878	0.366971	0.634595	0.5333
$\Delta$ LnP(-2)	-1.289305	0.525509	-2.453440	0.0240
ECM(-1)	-0.642260	0.297303	-2.160290	0.0437
R-squared	0.505763	Mean dependent var		0.057244
Adjusted R-squared	0.037539	S.D. dependent var		0.418294
S.E. of regression	0.410368	Akaike info criterion		1.363326
Sum squared resid	3.199629	Schwarz criterion		2.182119
Log likelihood	-6.903190	Hannan-Quinn criter.		1.654646
F-statistic	1.080173	Durbin-Watson stat		1.942161
Prob(F-statistic)	0.433359			



**Table 6: The Parsimonious Balance of Payments Model**

Dependent Variable: DLNFR Method: Least Squares				
Sample (adjusted): 1973 2010 Included observations: 38 after adjustments				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.188412	0.110910	1.698775	0.1001
$\Delta$ LnDC	-0.155119	0.090862	-1.707189	0.0985
$\Delta$ Lni	-0.314754	0.177369	-1.774576	0.0865
$\Delta$ Lne	0.346682	0.183701	1.887209	0.0692
$\Delta$ LnFr(-1)	0.311553	0.181013	1.721163	0.0959
$\Delta$ LnFr(-2)	0.392522	0.163923	2.394555	0.0233
$\Delta$ Lni(-2)	0.468777	0.181188	2.587246	0.0150
$\Delta$ LnP(-2)	-0.772340	0.292697	-2.638702	0.0132
ECM(-1)	-0.313438	0.140786	-2.226347	0.0339
R-squared	0.402433	Mean dependent var		0.057244
Adjusted R-squared	0.237587	S.D. dependent var		0.418294
S.E. of regression	0.365239	Akaike info criterion		1.026862
Sum squared resid	3.868578	Schwarz criterion		1.414711
Log likelihood	-10.51038	Hannan-Quinn criter.		1.164856
F-statistic	2.441264	Durbin-Watson stat		1.710778
Prob(F-statistic)	0.037379			

The estimated model of the balance of payments of Sierra Leone shows that domestic credit has a negative effect on the balance of payments with an elasticity of -0.16. Though this is consistent with the monetary approach to the balance of payments in qualitative terms, it is in contrast with the monetary approach in terms of the one-for-one impact predicted by the monetary approach to the balance of payments. Interest rate also has a negative effect on the balance of payments with a contemporaneous elasticity of -0.31 while exchange rate has a positive effect with a contemporaneous elasticity of 0.35. However, income and the price level have no contemporaneous effect on the balance of payments. Moreover, while the price level has a two period lag effect on the balance of payments with an elasticity of -0.77, income is not significant even in lag form. These results imply that monetary variables that affect the demand for money (interest rate, exchange rate and the price level) are relevant in affecting the balance of payments of Sierra Leone unlike the real variable, income. Thus, disequilibrium in the money market via

changes in money demand, emanating from change in interest rate , exchange rate and the price level leads to disequilibrium in the balance of payments. Moreover, disequilibrium in the money market via changes in money supply, emanating from changes in domestic credit translates into disequilibrium in the balance of payments. This reveals that monetary policy is important in balance of payments adjustment in the short run.

The error correction term has the right sign, is significant at the 5% level, and lies in the relevant range. The speed of adjustment of the error correction term shows that 31% of the deviation of the short run balance of payments from the long run is covered up within a year. The  $R^2$  shows that 40% of variations in foreign reserve is explained by the explanatory variables in the model. This value is reasonable since all the variables in the error-correction model are stationary and there is therefore no spurious correlation. The F-statistic shows that the null hypothesis that the variables of the error correction model are jointly insignificant is rejected at the 5% level of significance.

Diagnostic tests were carried out to test the residuals for homoscedasticity, serial correlation and autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH Effect). Appendix Table 1 shows the results of these tests. The results show that the residuals are free from serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH Effect). The model was also tested for residual normality and the stability of the parameters and the results are given in Appendix Figures 1 and 2. The results show that the residuals are normal and the parameters are stable.

## **5. CONCLUSION**

The paper sought to investigate the role of monetary variables on the balance of payments of Sierra Leone, a country that has been experiencing poor external sector performance over the last three decades. The study period was 1970 to 2010 and the methodology involved testing for unit root and cointegration and the estimation of a short run balance of payments model that accounts for delayed effects within the context of an error correction model.

The study reveals that disequilibrium in the money market, emanating from monetary variables such as domestic credit, interest rate, exchange rate and the price level translates into balance of payments disequilibrium. Specifically, increased domestic credit and interest rate deteriorates the balance of payments while nominal exchange rate depreciation improves the balance of payments, all being in the contemporaneous sense. Increase in the price level deteriorates the balance of payments not in the same period however but with lags. Moreover, the negative effect of interest rate on the balance of payments is reversed over time.

The policy implication of the results is in conformity with that of the monetary approach to the balance of payments that domestic credit restraint is essential for balance of payments development. In addition, balance of payments problem in Sierra Leone require measures to reduce inflation since the price level is found to have negative effect on the balance of payments. Exchange rate depreciation has a favourable effect on the balance of payments but the potential inflationary effect has a negative effect on the balance of payments and the latter lasts longer than the former. Hence monetary authorities should gauge the importance of immediate effect and medium term effect (which is expected to work through price increases) on the balance of payments, when faced with an option of encouraging a depreciating nominal exchange rate in Sierra Leone, except where there are clear policies to counter potential inflationary effects of such depreciation. Moreover, increased interest rate is an option for favourable balance of payments adjustment in Sierra Leone in the medium term, though it is unfavourable in the short term. This follows from the fact that interest rate has a negative contemporaneous effect on the balance of payments but a positive effect after two lags.

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
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## APPENDIX


**Appendix Table 1: Residual Diagnostic Tests**

<b>Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:</b>			
F-statistic	2.042056	Prob. F(2,27)	0.1493
Obs*R-squared	4.992784	Prob. Chi-Square(2)	0.0824
<b>Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey</b>			
F-statistic	0.956000	Prob. F(8,29)	0.4881
Obs*R-squared	7.930143	Prob. Chi-Square(8)	0.4403
Scaled explained SS	2.908865	Prob. Chi-Square(8)	0.9399
<b>Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH</b>			
F-statistic	0.048831	Prob. F(1,35)	0.8264
Obs*R-squared	0.051549	Prob. Chi-Square(1)	0.8204

**Appendix Figure 1: Residual Normality Test Results**



**Appendix Figure 2: Model-Stability Test**



## **Addressing Organised Crime in Sierra Leone: The Role of the Security-Development Nexus – Sacha Jespersen, London School of Economics and Political Science.**

The war on drugs has come under increasing scrutiny. At the Summit of the Americas in April 2012 several Latin American presidents declared the war on drugs a failure. This was preceded by the 2011 report of the Global Commission on Drugs Policy, which stated that ‘the global war on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals and societies around the world’ (Policy 2011). These critiques have sparked new debates on how to address drug use and drug trafficking (see for example Molina 2012). Molina’s proposal for decriminalisation and regulation may still be a distant reality, but debates on alternative strategies need to be aired.

The war on drugs has emphasised prohibition, resulting in a strong focus on law enforcement strategies targeting the organised crime networks that are engaged in drug trafficking. However this results in similar approaches to drug trafficking around the world. Glenny (2008) has noted that organised crime networks are usually several steps ahead of law enforcement. Blanket strategies to address organised crime just make this easier. Such an approach can be compared to treating different strains of a virus with the same medication, a practice that will increase resistance everywhere. As Linsker explains ‘in the drugs trade, like any other business, it’s about competitive advantage. The rules change and you have to adapt’ (cited in Barber 2011).

The security-development nexus, which merges security and development approaches, is increasingly being used to frame initiatives to address organised crime. Such an approach shifts the focus away from pure law enforcement to address other elements of organised crime. With a wider range of tools available, organised crime can be addressed in new and innovative ways that impede organised crime networks. However, the security-development nexus is hampered by conceptual confusion which can limit the shift away from a law enforcement approach. This article will examine how organised crime operates in Sierra Leone and why a law enforcement approach is inadequate. The article will then examine why, despite acknowledging the interconnections between security and development in relation to organised crime, approaches to address it remain centred on law enforcement.

### **ORGANISED CRIME IN WEST AFRICA**

Sierra Leone is not at the top of many people’s lists when they think about countries involved in cocaine trafficking. However, that is why Sierra Leone and other West African countries have become a valuable transit point for cocaine being shipped from Latin America to Europe; customs authorities are unlikely to suspect a ship or plane arriving from Sierra Leone to be transporting cocaine. UNODC estimates that 30 tons of cocaine and 400kg of heroin were trafficked via West Africa in 2011 (UNODC 2012). While the West African route may have become less important in recent years, it is still estimated to bring a \$900 million profit for criminal organisations (UNODC 2012). As such, West Africa remains a significant transit region.

West Africa became recognised as a trafficking hub in December 2007 following the release of a UNODC report *Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development*. However, the region is not new to drug trafficking and other forms of organised crime. Ellis

(2009) details the key role that West Africa has played in drug trafficking since the 1950s. The region was first used by Lebanese smugglers transporting heroin to the US (Ellis 2009). The 1960s saw a boom in marijuana trafficking to Europe, primarily by Nigerian and Ghanaian smugglers (Ellis 2009). Nigerian and Ghanaian smugglers then expanded into cocaine and to some extent heroin (Ellis 2009). Nigeria in particular has a deep history of organised crime, with heavy involvement in drug trafficking, oil bunkering and financial crimes, such as advance fee fraud (Glenny 2008). The networks set up by Nigerian organised criminals were crucial in the rise of the region as a valuable transit hub for cocaine (Glenny 2008). The increased sophistication of the financial infrastructure in Nigeria and Ghana, and increasingly other countries in the region, has also played a key role (Ellis 2009).

While drug trafficking in West Africa is becoming a salient issue, research and media reports primarily focus on Nigeria, Ghana and increasingly Guinea-Bissau. Relatively little research has been done on trafficking in Sierra Leone. While it is not the primary transit hub in West Africa, there is still a significant amount of drugs passing through the country. In June 2007, 2.5 tonnes of cocaine was seized in Venezuela on a plane bound for Sierra Leone (UNODC 2008). In July 2008, 700kg of cocaine was seized at Lungi airport in Freetown (UNODC 2008). Although Sierra Leone is still not one of the main transit hubs in West Africa, it remains important. Limited capacity to patrol its waters and weak governance maintain Sierra Leone's status as a useful transit point. However, Sierra Leone's obscurity in the larger scheme of drug trafficking means that the structures are not as well understood as those in Nigeria or even Guinea Bissau.

Cocaine is entering Sierra Leone through shipping containers and by air through unmarked airstrips throughout the country (Wikileaks 2009c). Increasing flights to London, Paris and Brussels have created a gateway to Europe for cocaine traffickers, although there is still a prevalence of movements of drugs overland or by sea to Guinea for onward shipment (Wikileaks 2009c). Between January and October 2008, there were 17 drug seizures in Sierra Leone, totalling 743.5kg of cocaine and 10,602kg of cannabis (Wikileaks 2009c). However, observers note that this is only a fraction of the drugs passing through the country.<sup>6</sup>

Sierra Leone has had a number of successful prosecutions, which may serve as a deterrent for some trafficking networks. Following the 2008 interdiction at Lungi airport, 17 narcotics cases were pursued in the High Court with 15 convictions, including two police officers and one officer from the Office of National Security (Wikileaks 2009c). In April 2009 a number of narco-traffickers were extradited to the US for prosecution including the high profile Sierra Leonean Gibrilla Kamara, who had allegedly been active in the recruitment of South American organisations (Wikileaks 2009a).

As well as cocaine trafficking, Sierra Leone is becoming a significant source country for marijuana. In 2010, Vice President Samuel Sumara announced 'in some parts of our country, more and more of our people are developing interest and diverting their energies into the cultivation and trade of cannabis' (Johnson 2010). Mainly exported to neighbouring countries, marijuana production is beginning to threaten food security in the country. A leaked US cable notes that Sierra Leone is 'gradually emerging as one of the states in West Africa where the cultivation of marijuana is overtaking vital domestic crop farming' (Wikileaks 2009b).

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<sup>6</sup> Confidential interview with international official, Freetown, 26 January 2012.



At present 'West Africa has not witnessed the high levels of violence associated with the drug trade in Latin America, or the high levels of consumption in Europe and Latin America' (CIC 2012). However, there are reports that local consumption is rising. Sierra Leonean elites are purchasing cocaine, while crack cocaine is being traded on the street (Boas and Hatloy 2005; UNODC 2012). There have also been allegations of politicians using drugs to recruit youth to intimidate opposition supporters, particularly in the lead up to the 2012 election (Saidu 2011). While exploitative practices in Sierra Leone, such as diamond smuggling and illegal logging, are viewed negatively by locals, drug smuggling is not. Organised criminals are seen to be 'providing a service' (Mazzitelli 2007: 1085). As Sierra Leone has primarily been a transit country, there is a common perception that locals should benefit from the trade.<sup>7</sup> However, as local consumption rises, there is potential for this to change.

As drug trafficking in the region becomes better understood, concerns about violence are also being raised. In a letter to the Security Council ahead of a discussion on organised crime, the Togolese President expressed concern over the potential for inter-cartel violence similar to Mexico (Council 2012). There are also growing concerns over state capture. The Sierra Leone Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zainab Bangura, noted in 2009 that 'the cartels have not yet corrupted the government's senior levels, but sooner or later they will, because they have millions of dollars and you need to be a saint to reject them' (cited in CIC 2012: 1).

As the pace of cocaine trafficking has increased in West Africa, Mazzitelli (2007) has documented three different and complementary trafficking operations in the region. The first model is most closely linked to traditional organised crime structures. Latin American organisations have set up branches in some West African countries and coordinate the transit of cocaine through them (Mazzitelli 2011). This model also allegedly has links to the Sicilian mafia, as mafia boss Giovanni Bonomo was arrested at Dakar airport, Senegal (Berticelli 2007). However, local operators are becoming more involved in the cocaine trade as transporters, partners and final buyers (Mazzitelli 2011: 5). This has given rise to the second form of organised crime, where local trafficking networks are paid in kind in exchange for logistics, or purchase consignments directly from the traffickers for onward transportation into Europe (Mazzitelli 2007). In many cases this results in multinational trafficking networks. For example, in 2008 a network was dismantled in Togo with members from Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, South Africa, Ghana and Togo (Mazzitelli 2011).

UNODC cites that one third of cocaine remains in West Africa (see Hinshaw 2011). This is commonly inferred to mean that local drug use is increasing. While this may be the case, it has not risen enough to consume one third of all cocaine passing through the region. Many of the larger cartels pay for services 'in kind'. While recipients may sell some of this locally, both as cocaine and crack, the market and street value for cocaine in Europe and elsewhere continues to dwarf the local market. The local availability of cocaine has fostered a third model of trafficking, where 'freelance' traffickers transport a few kilograms of cocaine to Europe independently (Mazzitelli 2007). Mazzitelli (2011: 33) argues that this model in particular 'represents a new challenging and successful model of an organised crime network'. IISS describes this as the 'prototype of a West African model of criminal network, which favours one-off transaction-

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<sup>7</sup> Confidential interview with international official, Freetown, 27 January 2012.

based joint ventures rather than long standing relations' (IISS 2011). These models differ from those employed by 'classic' organised crime, such as Italian, Russian, Japanese and Chinese organised crime networks. This new model of organised crime presents a challenge for the strategies advocated by the 'war on drugs'.

Organised crime expands beyond drug trafficking in West Africa, particularly with the prevalence of financial crimes stemming from Nigeria. However, for Sierra Leone drug trafficking continues to be the primary expression of organised crime. Strategies to address drug trafficking tend to be encapsulated within broader strategies to address organized crime. While to focus here is primarily on drug trafficking in Sierra Leone, strategies to address it will be analysed within the context of organised crime more broadly.

## **ADDRESSING ORGANISED CRIME**

The security threats of organised crime have been well documented, from flows of drugs, people, arms and money, to violence and kidnapping, as well as links to terrorism. As such, a security approach that focuses on law enforcement is logical. An effective intelligence sector can work with other countries to trace and preempt traffickers; police forces can coordinate interdictions of drug shipments in collaboration with maritime and airport authorities; investigations teams can pursue individuals suspected of involvement in drug trafficking. However, when pursued in isolation a security approach is inadequate.

A security approach is based on a number of flawed assumptions. The first assumes that organised crime is separate from the state, and a phenomenon which the state needs to be protected (Cockayne and Pfister 2008). However, the separation between organised crime and the state is not always clear-cut. Glenny (2008: 80) notes that 'if a syndicate persuades a powerful state to acquiesce or cooperate in its schemes, then it has found the magic password to Aladdin's cave. For no organised criminal is as successful as the one who enjoys the backing of the state'. There has been increasing research into the involvement of government representatives in organised crime and state capture by organised crime groups (see Naim 2012). In the trial report following the 2008 cocaine seizure in Sierra Leone, Justice Nicholas Marke-Browne implicated government officials and security agents, in particular the then Minister of Transport and Aviation, and the Minister of Justice and Attorney General, who blocked his arrest (Gberie 2010). Addressing organised crime through state bodies such as the police or military when other state bodies are linked to organised crime is difficult. For example, in Mexico, where security structures were often complicit with drug cartels, President Calderón started by dismantling and rebuilding the state's security apparatus (Poiré 2012).

The second false assumption is that a punitive approach discourages individuals from engaging in organised crime. Particularly in countries with a high unemployment rate, such as Sierra Leone, organised crime can offer lucrative income generating opportunities. When arrests are made, a long line of unemployed people is waiting to take their place. When one person is arrested, they are rapidly replaced by someone else. A Sierra Leonean law enforcement officer witnessed how 'those who have successfully trafficked cocaine to Europe, they come back with big cars, they live glamorous, they're role models and an inspiration to those who haven't'.<sup>8</sup> The

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<sup>8</sup> Confidential interview with national law enforcement official, Freetown, 24 January 2012.

rise of freelance traffickers also undermines the effectiveness of a punitive approach. As the most visible part of the drug trade, freelance traffickers are the easiest targets for arrest. However, freelancers are not part of an organised crime 'network'; at most they have come in contact with one or two other people involved in the drug trade. As such, they cannot provide a pathway to arresting drug 'kingpins'.

By focusing on the security aspects of organised crime, initiatives to address it become reactive. Interdictions are launched to respond to suspected incidents of trafficking and police forces seek to track down individuals involved in organised crime. However, a security approach does not address the circumstances that allow organised crime to flourish and prosper in particular countries. As mentioned above, organised crime provides lucrative income generating opportunities, particularly for individuals with few other prospects. However, if there were other options available it may detract from the allure of organised crime. This is not to say that high employment rates cannot coexist with organised crime. Studies have shown that organised crime is present in most, if not all, countries around the world (see for example Glenny 2008). Yet it is much easier for organised crime to take hold when it provides opportunities not available elsewhere.

In these circumstances, development strategies become a valuable companion to security measures, providing alternative sources of income and rebuilding essential services and institutions. The security-development nexus, which merges traditionally separate security and development approaches, provides an innovative response to organised crime. The traditional law enforcement elements can be combined with income generating activities to develop a multifaceted approach to tackling organised crime. Since Kofi Annan announced in 2004 that 'development and security are inextricably linked' (UN 2004) many organisations have eagerly merged security and development in their initiatives. In 2011, the UN created the Taskforce on Organised Crime and Drug Trafficking to bring together various departments, including the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Women, Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and others in a multifaceted approach (UNODC 2011a). In Sierra Leone the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has partnered with DPA, DPKO, Interpol and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to address the security and development aspects of organised crime.

While the security-development nexus is being enthusiastically implemented by policymakers, the nexus has received significant criticism from scholars. Chandler (2007: 362) argues that 'the security-development nexus reflects a retreat from strategic policymaking and a more inward looking approach to foreign policy'. Development becomes more about increasing security in donor countries than recipient countries, removing its transformative potential (Chandler 2007). For example, in 2010, the UK government demanded 'that projects in the developing world must make the 'maximum possible contribution' to British national security' (Watt 2010: 1). Duffield (2010) sees the security-development nexus as an extension of Western foreign policy, containing the migration of the global poor, encouraging self-reliance and entrenching the life-chance divide between developed and underdeveloped countries.

While the security-development nexus is presented as a fixed concept to frame initiatives to address organised crime, significant confusion remains over what the nexus is and what its

constituent features are. There is 'widespread discourse emerging as though there were broad agreement on both the content of these concepts and the consequences of creating policy that reflects a (certain) understanding of the 'nexus' (Stern and Ojendal 2010: 8). Tschirgi et al. (Tschirgi et al. 2010) argue that the use of poorly defined concepts can result in ineffective action, widening the gap between policy and practice. As Waddell (2006: 532) notes 'rather than being natural, self-evident and straightforward, linking security and development is complicated, contested and confused'.

While security and development may have once been easily defined terms, they have since expanded into many identities. Advocates of human security have called for a shift in focus from the state to individuals. However, state security remains a priority while threats such as terrorism remain. Similarly, development has shifted to focus on individual wellbeing through human development, but economic development retains a key role. These varied influences on security and development create a broad spectrum of definitions from individual to state centred approaches. Both security and development span a spectrum from people-centred approaches to state-based approaches.

While actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone have acknowledged the interlinkages between security and development, organised crime is being addressed through a particular version of the security-development nexus. The importance of individual wellbeing is recognised, but it is viewed as something that will arise from protecting the interests of the state, through security measures and economic development. Definitions of security and development can be established by identifying the referent object of security and development; identifying whose security/development is of primary interest (Buzan et al. 1998). The following section will explore how security and development are understood by the key actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone.

## **THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN SIERRA LEONE**

In Sierra Leone, organised crime is being addressed through the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI). The WACI grew out of the ECOWAS Political Declaration on Drug Trafficking and Other Organised Crimes in West Africa. The four pilot countries, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D'Ivoire and Guinea Bissau reiterated their dedication to address organised crime in 2010 through the Freetown Commitment on Combating Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa. Within Sierra Leone the WACI is being implemented by UNODC in partnership with UNIPSIL, UNOWA, Interpol and ECOWAS.

The ECOWAS Political Declaration recognises the importance of both security and development. The preamble emphasises the 'need to promote, foster and accelerate the economic and social development of our states in order to improve the living standards of our peoples' (ECOWAS 2008). While this passage refers to the economic and social development of the 'state', this is to improve standards for individuals/peoples living within the state. However, the emphasis on the state is strengthened when the declaration shifts to security. 'Illicit drug trafficking... and other organised crime are serious threats to the regional and national security, political, economic and social development of member states' (ECOWAS 2008). Here the referent object is the state/regional level, as the emphasis is on the 'consequences on peace and

security in the region' (ECOWAS 2008). The declaration also recognises the 'right of citizens of the community to live in safety and security without the threats posed by drug abuse and trafficking and other organised crime' (ECOWAS 2008). As such, the Political Declaration addresses the needs of individuals/peoples, the state and the region, acknowledging the wide-ranging impact that organised crime can have at all levels.

The WACI reiterates this wide range of concerns. Illicit drug trafficking and organised crime are recognised for their contribution to corruption, money laundering, and the movement of small arms – issues which impact on the state. However, it is also recognised that organised crime 'undermines the rule of law, democratic institutions and governance in our states', and is an 'impediment to economic development' (ECOWAS 2010). While these factors have an impact on individuals/peoples, the primary referent object here is the regime and state, as threats to rule of law, democratic institutions, governance and economic development challenge the viability of the regime and the state. However, the WACI also acknowledges the 'need to encourage and accelerate the economic and social development of our states in order to improve the living standards of our people' (ECOWAS 2010). This statement confuses attempts to identify the referent object. While the living standards of people are raised as a concern, the state is also considered as an important element. As the development of the state is viewed as a way of improving living standards, the state can be taken as the primary referent object, with the benefits flowing down to citizens.

As the key actor involved in the formulation of the Political Declaration that informs the WACI, it is necessary to examine the ECOWAS perspective on security and development. ECOWAS was initially formed to promote economic integration in West Africa. However, security needs have played a significant role, and ECOWAS has increasingly become involved in regional security cooperation (Aning 2004). Security protocols were established in 1976, 1978 and 1981, followed by the 1993 Treaty to establish a security framework, and more recently in 2000 with the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. This protocol views security holistically, recognising that 'economic and social development and the security of people and states are intrinsically linked' (ECOWAS 2000). Yet the focus has remained primarily on the region and state with flow on benefits to individuals. 'Proliferation of conflicts constitute a threat to the peace and security in the African continent and undermines our efforts to improve the living standards of our people' (ECOWAS 2000). However, Aning (2004) argues this is beginning to change. 'ECOWAS through its increasing involvement in sub-regional security, seeks to shift emphasis away from traditional regime centred security to more people-centred approaches' (Aning 2004: 533). This is achieved through a focus on inclusive democracy and good governance. 'Good governance, rule of law and sustainable development are essential for peace and conflict prevention' (ECOWAS 2000). This again raises the question of whether the state is secured by first addressing the needs of citizens, or if citizens' needs are met by first addressing state security. While renewed conflict has serious implications for individuals, they are often more concerned with issues that affect their daily life, such as household income, local level criminality and resource availability.

UNODC sees organised crime as a threat to peace and human security. It 'violates human rights and undermines economic, social, cultural, political and civil development of societies around the world' (UNODC 2011c). However, the referent object is centred on the state/region as

organised crime ‘dwarfs local economies’, and ‘makes West Africa more prone to political instability and less able to achieve the MDGs’ (UNODC 2009: 1). UNODC also believes that organised crime aggravates instability and threatens regional and global security. UNODC acknowledge a two-way relationship between security and development. ‘Organised crime plays a role in perpetuating both the poverty and the instability of the region, while poverty and instability provide optimum conditions for organised crime’ (UNODC 2009: 9). UNODC emphasizes the need for rule of law reform to address organised crime. Although rule of law has been frequently connected to development, it does not always imply a focus on the security/development of individuals/peoples. Without rule of law there is potential for lawlessness and chaos to ensue, which may threaten the regime in power and the stability of the state, with implications extending regionally and internationally.

Within Sierra Leone, UNIPSIL is the driving force behind WACI. UNODC has had staff members located within the UNIPSIL compound working in partnership with UNIPSIL’s Senior Police Advisor. UNIPSIL’s approach is driven by the Joint UN Vision for Sierra Leone, which seeks to improve coordination between all UN agencies. The five aims of the Joint Vision are to consolidate peace and stability; integrate rural areas into the national economy; economic and social integration of youth; equitable and affordable access to health; and accessible and credible public services (UN 2009). These aims are underpinned by capacity building, the Millennium Development Goals, human rights protection, gender equality, poverty reduction and sub-regional cooperation (UN 2009). While all of the five aims, in particular equitable and affordable health, seek to address the development needs of individuals, an overarching preoccupation with security remains. The majority of the aims seek to prevent renewed conflict. The consolidation of peace and security overtly seeks to prevent conflict. However, other goals also contribute to this aim. Integrating rural areas into the national economy seeks to address the ‘deteriorating social climate’ created by the gap between urban and rural communities through agriculture and economic development (UN 2009). The economic and social integration of youth seeks to address the ongoing marginalisation of youth, which was a significant factor in the onset and continuation of violent conflict. Accessible and credible public services also seek to consolidate peace and security and ‘lay the foundation for economic development’ (UN 2009).

Organised crime is addressed through UNIPSIL’s Police and National Security Unit, which further emphasises a focus on security. ‘Strengthening Sierra Leone’s security forces in facing the threat of international organised crime has both a capacity building as well as a wider political aspect’ (UN 2009). This implies the primary referent object is regional/international security, which is provided by supporting the state to address organised crime. However, UN personnel engaged in initiatives to address organised crime do not view the problem purely as a security issue. ‘People still talk about it being drugs, drugs, drugs, but drugs are just a commodity, the same as human trafficking or diamonds, oil or cigarettes, anything, you can use is the commodity, what it’s about is the business’.<sup>9</sup> UNIPSIL also has programmes addressing drug abuse. This broadens approaches to include citizens/people.

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<sup>9</sup> Confidential interview with international official, Freetown, 26 January 2012.

## **IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS**

Actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone now acknowledge that development is necessary for security and security is necessary for development. However, the causal relationship between the two concepts is not investigated. ‘The relationship between these phenomena is presented as commonsensical and uncontested, but the specific nature of the relationship has been glossed over, with little real empirical evidence to demonstrate nexus claims’ (Denney 2011: 275). Organisations participating in the WACI argue that peace consolidation and security will result in economic development. This approach focuses on the security and development of the recipient state with flow on effects for citizens. This is now reflected in the approach of local actors addressing organised crime through the Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TOCU). ‘If we try and mitigate the level of organised crime it will open up ways for development to come into this country’.<sup>10</sup> Perhaps this approach has arisen from the UK Department for International Development’s (DfID) earlier approach to security sector reform within the framework of the security-development nexus. DfID followed a ‘security first’ approach based on the assumption that ‘a democratically run, accountable, competent, effective and efficient security sector helps to reduce the risk of conflict and enhance the security of the citizens of the country, and in the process helps to create the necessary conditions for development’ (Government 2004).

A security first approach takes the nexus between security and development as sequential rather than simultaneous. A simultaneous nexus acknowledges that security and development ‘are mutually reinforcing and need to be pursued in parallel’ (Berdal 2009:96). In contrast, a security first approach prioritises security, which is primarily provided through law enforcement. The WACI programme document identifies Priorities 1 and 3 of the UN Joint Vision for Sierra Leone as guiding principles: consolidation of peace and prosperity; and economic and social integration of youth (UNODC 2011b). However, the project outcomes include the strengthening of coordination and intelligence gathering and sharing mechanisms among law enforcement agencies; enhanced capacity to investigate and prosecute illicit drug trafficking and organised crime; and enhanced border management (UNODC 2011b). These outcomes continue to prioritise law enforcement to consolidate peace and security, and do not directly address the economic and social integration of youth.

While the security-development nexus is guiding initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra Leone, a particular version of the security-development nexus is employed. The nexus has the potential to shift approaches to organised crime away from a pure law enforcement approach and identify the broad range of issues that influence organised crime and provide fertile ground for it to become established. However, this relies on perspectives of security and development that prioritise the needs of individual citizens as part of their approach, rather than as a flow on effect.

## **CONCLUSION**

There is a growing recognition that the current prohibition approach of the ‘war on drugs’ is failing. However, there is a reticence to deprioritise security, particularly state security. Organisations addressing drug trafficking and organised crime have begun to use the security-

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<sup>10</sup> Confidential interview with national law enforcement official, Freetown, 25 January 2012.

development nexus to frame their initiatives. In Sierra Leone the security-development nexus has become a core feature of the WACI. UNODC recognises that ‘a post-conflict environment, fragile political and state institutions, coupled with increased drug abuse, a growing crime rate and weak law enforcement agencies all combine to have the potential to derail Sierra Leone’s tentative steps toward recovery and development’ (UNODC 2010:2). Despite this acknowledgment, the security-development nexus that is implemented reflects how participating organisations understand security and development. This has resulted in a ‘security first’ approach, which does little to challenge traditional approaches to organised crime. Both security and development organisations have contributed to effective reforms in the security and law enforcement sectors. However, attempts to address wider societal problems such as youth unemployment, poverty and public sector reform have faltered. Unless these issues are addressed in tandem with initiatives to bolster law enforcement agencies, organised crime will continue to take hold in Sierra Leone.

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## **'A New Perspective on the War in Sierra Leone'**

A Critique of *Epistemologies of African Conflicts: Violence, Evolutionism and the War in Sierra Leone* (New York: Palgrave, 2012) by Zubairu Wai

By Lansana Gberie

The Sierra Leone 'rebel' war (1991-2002) has over the years attracted huge scholarly attention: a debate about the origin and nature of the war still rages among academics and, before the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), jurists. This is somewhat curious, since the conflict, though devastating, was puny. A hundred or so well-trained soldiers with perhaps two combat helicopters would have snuffed out Foday Saybanah Sankoh and the petty army he called Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in March 1991, and no one would have remembered either after a year or two. In the event, the Sierra Leonean state, denuded after decades of misrule, incompetence and corruption under the All Peoples Congress (APC), not only failed to contain the RUF but later became somewhat complicit in its depredations. The so-called rebellion festered, violence engulfed the country, thousands of civilians were killed, about half the population of the country displaced, and only with the insertion of thousands of foreign troops – who enforced a peace agreement by disarming combatants – was stability realized.

It is entirely possible that a hundred years from now this traumatic period will be treated as a not-so-significant episode in the history of Sierra Leone, if indeed the country survives to that point and prospers. The point is that the war resolved nothing: nothing fundamentally changed as a result of the war: the postwar settlement ensured that Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and his Sierra Leone Peoples Party, which managed the transition from war to peace, were re-elected in a landslide in 2002. The SLPP had led Sierra Leone to independence from Britain in April 1961. Its chief opponent at the time was the APC, the same as in 2002 when the war ended. The entire postwar reconfiguration of the state – sponsored, with exquisite fitness, by the British – was anchored on restoring colonial era institutions that had been neutered by the APC; and a former colonial District Commissioner was hired, from his retirement in the UK, to help with a Paramount Chieftaincy restoration scheme. A report by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 2004 found that some of the conditions which led to the 'rebel war' of the 1990s were still very

much present at the time the report was published. In 2007, the APC once again gained power by defeating the SLPP. It was re-elected in 2012. Since independence, in other words, the two parties remain the only ones capable of winning national elections and running the country in a democratic setting.

The disturbing question that issued out of the war, therefore, was: why was it that the RUF, which many agree was a largely criminal group perpetuating near-mercenary violence, was able to recruit support in the country and survived for so long why the state and its agents appeared so ineffective in meeting that challenge? Thanks to Paul Richards – who must be credited as the first scholar to study the war with industry and seriousness – the state or rather its “patrimonial” nature was a focus of the early analyses of the war but this was soon overtaken by other, more tantalizing aspects of the war. This turned on the basic character of the RUF: its neurotic brutality, its reliance on foreign fighters at the initial stages, and on child soldiers throughout the war, and its enigmatic and somewhat cult-like leader, Sankoh. The analyses that followed – which more or less took as its starting point Robert Kaplan’s feverish but highly influential ‘The Coming Anarchy’ article in the *Atlantic Monthly* magazine in 1994 – congealed into a depiction of the war as part of a wider narrative of youth nihilism, state collapse, and mercenarism in West Africa. The war, in other words, had major geopolitical significance.

### **Wai’s Purpose and Method**

Zubairu Wai, a young Sierra Leonean scholar who lived in the country throughout the war period, is not impressed with much of what has been written about the war, or about similar wars in Africa. In *Epistemologies of Conflict: Violence, Evolutionism and War in Sierra Leone* (2012), he makes a refreshing and provocative critique of the ways in which the war has been analysed or depicted. His targets are wide. Wai is not much interested, in this book, in giving an account of the war from his own perspective: he gives only 19 of the book’s 263 pages to a chronological narrative of the war, and this account, though largely accurate, is bland. (He has informed me that he is writing another volume dedicated to the war.) The book comes alive when Wai is demolishing the various interpretations – or, as he prefers, ‘discourses’ – of the war’s meanings and character. He does this with forensic acuity and brilliance, laying out his opponents’ arguments often scrupulously fairly, and then destroying them with relentless cruelty, leaving no

room for appeal. (By way of full disclosure, I must report that I am myself a small victim of Dr. Wai's scalpel, though I come off largely intact.)

"The themes and questions that animate this book emerged from my frustration with the way contemporary African conflicts have come to be understood," Wai writes in the introduction. The causes and nature of the Sierra Leone civil war had been puzzling enough for him, but once he started to study what others have written about the war, "I started to detect a disconnect between my experiences, having lived through the war, and the accounts that were purporting to explain it" (p.2). The anxiety is deeply felt; and it is part of the originality and rightness of Wai's purpose and method that he has placed the alleged distortions of the published accounts of the war in Sierra Leone within the larger context of the debasement of the African past and present condition by conventional Western scholarship.

Wai is interested, in other words, in epistemology – which is the philosophy underpinning the production of knowledge – with respect to Africa. Here he relies particularly on the work of the Duke University scholar VY Mudimbe (who provides an enthusiastic but characteristically bombastic preface) as a theoretical framework for his own understanding of the "problematique". Mudimbe is a notoriously difficult and opaque writer, a trait which his admirers perhaps see as evidence of his profundity; Wai, clearly much better at the use of the English language, tries strenuously to emulate this trait. Mudimbe both fires and limits Wai's vision – as someone who prefers clarity in writing above all else, I think that this reliance on Mudimbe somewhat obscures the originality of Wai's purpose and method. (In the preface, for example, Mudimbe applauds Wai for having "ontological seniorship" or "anteriority" – which means, I later found out, only something like 'native interpreter', in other words that Wai's work stand above others for this reason. But other works that Wai so convincingly argues against are also produced by 'natives'. Wai's nuanced justification for his rejection of some of the scholarly reflections on the war by other Sierra Leoneans is that though their work may disagree with those of Western scholars "in remaining within the frames of Africanism and in their fidelity to the conceptualities of colonial library, they may not be very different epistemologically from the perspectives of Western discourses." I find this argument unanswerable: only Wai, one presumes, has managed to escape this invidious colonial trap!)

This approach to knowledge – which derives from the work of Michel Foucault, Edward Said and many others, mainly from France’s Ecole Normale Superieure – takes it as a matter of course that the production of knowledge is not neutral or innocent; it is a calculated part of the power matrix. It emphasises deconstruction, poststructuralism, and postmodernism. This approach can be taken too far (to justify crude nativism, for example); when applied in moderation it contains very important elements of truth. Wai attempts to pursue the following questions, among others: who produces knowledge of these African conflicts and why? What are the “modalities of the dominant and dominating” perspectives? What are the “epistemological structures” within which the knowledge is produced? What is the nature of these structures that make the knowledge production and the “particular interpretive dispositions” that they foreground possible? Above all, what is the role of the knowledge production in “defining Africa’s position in the world, its relationship with the West, and the articulation of international policy toward Africa as a result of these conflicts?”

The anxiety suffusing these loaded questions suggests the very large claim that there is an overarching agenda driving the production of this knowledge of African conflict. But is this always the case? And who controls this agenda? “It does mean something,” Wai writes, “when conflicts are interpreted or understood as cultural (‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’) or economic (‘greed’ and the struggle over economic resources). For whom or for what the discourse is produced then becomes an important question.” Of this one might ask: more important than the fact that the interpretation is true? Surely, virulent ethnicity or ‘tribalism’ exists in parts of Africa? Surely, also, there was nothing ennobling about the campaigns of the likes of Charles Taylor, and he seemed more interested in primitive accumulation than in building the state or its sources of wealth? Truth, however, is disputed or denied within this framework: it is a subjective concept, as Foucault and Derrida made us to understand. I need not state here that I am unsympathetic to this approach, but I shall lay out carefully Wai’s arguments.

### **Power and Truth**

I understand Wai’s book to be concerned with showing how power, which seems to reside solely in that omniscient entity called the West, manufactures realities or ‘truths’ in Africa by

interpreting the African condition, especially its many crises, and then, through its many powerful agencies, contriving 'solutions' for the crises that justifies those manufactured realities. The book, in Wai's words, is about the "discursive production of African realities and how the continent is constructed as an object of knowledge and power" (p.13). But aren't some realities independent of 'discourses'? This approach draws from Mudimbe's seminal work *The Invention of Africa* (published in 1988; Said's *Orientalism*, published 10 years earlier, is the intellectual path-breaker for these brave insights.)

Narrowing on the Sierra Leone rebel war, Wai, like other analysts, begins his critique by tearing apart Robert Kaplan's notorious "Coming Anarchy", which uneasily welded together the thesis of Martin van Creveld about post-Cold War wars by non-state actors, Thomas Homer-Dixon's pessimistic environmental prognosis and Samuel Huntington's thesis about the unavoidable 'clash of civilizations' to describe the war as anarchic and criminal (as opposed to political) violence that would lead to a Hobbesian state of nullity and terror. Wai then confronts Kaplan's critics, in particular Paul Richards, a British anthropologist with very intimate knowledge of Sierra Leone, whose *Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Resources and Youth* (1996) was the first serious study of the war. Richards had analysed the RUF as a 'group of embittered pedagogues' fighting to replace the corrupt patrimonial state with a 'revolutionary egalitarian one' and appealing "directly to deracinated youths with blighted educational prospects." Wai isn't impressed by Richards' efforts either. He notes the extended criticisms of Richards' book by Yusuf Bangura and Ibrahim Abdullah, finding the interpretations of both, however, only marginally preferable to Richards' because though "Richards and his Sierra Leonean critics may be separated by their theoretical and methodological formulations, but insofar as they are witnessing to the 'truth' of Africanism, are epistemologically bound by its condition of knowledge, and are immersed in the context of its epistemological region of possibility, the differences between them might in fact be exaggerated" p.126). He gives short shrift to the luminous work of William Reno (from which, Wai writes, Richards derived his ideas of patrimonialism and state collapse in Sierra Leone).

Wai credits Bangura's critique of Richards with setting the analytical template and research agenda for other Sierra Leonean intellectuals, Abdullah and Ismail Rashid in particular. The

result does not please him. He is particularly concerned about Abdullah's "lumpen thesis": the interpretation of the war as driven by 'lumpen youth', which Abdullah defines as socially uprooted and criminally disposed young people among whom had emerged, after decades of a corrupt and ultimately failed one-party system, a 'lumpen youth culture' - a despairing anti-social movement of drug addicts, petty thieves and gamblers, growing up mostly in the slums of Freetown. This group, Abdullah contended, formed the core leadership of the RUF, which is why the group was pathologically disposed to criminal violence and terror. The war, in other words, was a kind of rootless urban youth revolt. The "mutilation, murder and rape of innocent women and children by the RUF are acts that are incompatible with a revolutionary project," Abdullah argues. "The 'revolutionary' acts...were committed again and again precisely because of the social composition (of the RUF)...A lumpen social movement breeds a lumpen revolution."

Wai makes an extended discussion of this thesis, laying out Abdullah's argument carefully and accurately, noting that the substantial narrative reconstructing the origins of the RUF "really did clarify a lot of misconceptions about the war and provided information on exactly what the rebels were" (p.210). The influence of Abdullah's article on the historiography of the war remains profound; when it was first published, in 1996 or 1997, its impact was almost revolutionary, and its immediate adherents, including the present reviewer, were many. Wai states, correctly, that I later "ditched" the lumpen theory in favour of emphasizing the mercenary character of the RUF, but I still flinch at his demolishing the theory for its "totalilising conceptual simplicity" and as a "disparaging and condescending elitist slur" that does not provide a "useful conceptual and analytical category" (p.224). The problem Wai finds with Abdullah's lumpen thesis is that it is a catch-all term which "fails to disaggregate [the] disparate groups of insurgents by grouping them under a label that suggests their homogenous and fixed essences" (p.219). If, as Abdullah sees it, lumpens were unemployed or unemployable youths, how does Foday Sankoh, a middle aged photographer, fit that description?

This line of inquiry leads Wai to a number of very astute comments. Though few Sierra Leoneans became combatants during the war, he writes, "we were all caught up in the same pattern of violence and warfare", which is why "ordinary civilians would easily hack to death or burn those accused of being rebels or rebel collaborators alike" (p.21) There was "no wholesale



predilection” towards violence among any group or class of Sierra Leoneans, and violence is never “psychobiological; it is always social and political.”

It also leads him towards stating his own tentative position on the origins of the war, which – in its present form – is, however, far from being convincing.

### **Conclusion: Wai’s Will to Truth**

Wai states three “interrelated series of violence” out of which the RUF insurgency issued. They are: firstly, “the structural and systemic violence exerted by the global political and economic order” which reduced Sierra Leone to an impoverished backwater; secondly, the fact that Sierra Leone was founded through violence and this foundational neurosis, so to speak, infected its very nature, making it instinctively violent politically; and finally, the creation of “an atmosphere of violence” in the course of the country’s history (p.223-4). It is worth quoting his exact words here: “we were,” he writes, “caught up in a...pattern of victimhood or victimization, so that even those culpable for perpetrating the most disturbing atrocities were themselves victims of the political violence of the state informed by the culture of violence it had been founded on...In short, the war in Sierra Leone was a collective indictment of the very idea of Sierra Leone” (p.221).

This is Wai’s astounding thesis. Forget about the odd phrase “collective indictment”; forget also the fact that the provocative thesis suggests a sullen strain of fatalism: it cannot be glibly dismissed; it demands proper interrogation.

Wai foregrounds the thesis in the very interesting Chapter 2, an idiosyncratic retelling of the story of the Sierra Leone colony – it is entitled, with a bow to Mudimbe, “The Idea of Sierra Leone.” In it he identifies two events in the country’s history “which have become so central” in the way it is “imagined and narrated”: its discovery by Pedro da Cintra in 1462 and the resettlement of freed slaves in the new colony in 1787. The events, he writes, “were not neutral encounters or natural historical occurrences and accidents; they were political and violent acts signifying, and making possible, the imposition of new cultural models and new political and economic orders” (p.68). But how violent and linked were these events? Da Cintra certainly did not set out to ‘discover’ Sierra Leone, and there was clearly nothing violent about his purpose.

Over 300 years separate his visit and the establishment of Freetown. Wai introduces the buccaneering trips of the English slaver John Hawkins and the ensuing trans-Atlantic slave trade to fill the gap, but this suggests new questions. Hawkins first raided the coast in 1562, exactly 100 years after da Contra's visits. During much of the 100 years, Europe appeared to have been in turmoil, gripped by forebodings that it was in irreversible decline, and certainly no one there seriously considered the possibility of building an empire in West Africa. Europe revived; the slave trade and the American colonies helped in this revival, but by the time the Sierra Leone colony was founded, new ideas and new sensibilities had taken hold on its most powerful nation, Britain.

Wai roundly rejects the humanitarian motives of the British in establishing the colony of Sierra Leone for freed slaves, depicting it as a racist and violent enterprise, and in one extraordinary endnote, he writes of the Liberated Africans: "They were known as 'Liberated Africans' because they were thought to have been 'liberated' by the British Navy from slave ships. I prefer 'Recaptives', however, which suggests that these kidnapped Africans remained in captivity, even after the British rescued them from slave ships; indeed it was very easy to identify where these captives came from, but because of the British desire to civilize and Christianize, they were not returned to their original native lands but were brought to Freetown for those purposes, and so they remained in captivity of another kind" (p.232).

Of course, it was not at all easy to have known where the motley collection of Africans in any slave ship originated from; it certainly would have been either impossible or profoundly cruel to have returned them to such places (in all likelihood they would have been easily re-enslaved or perhaps killed). In any case, Sierra Leone was not the only place where the Liberated Africans were resettled by the British – some were sent to Brazil, Luanda and a few other places. The anti-slavery issue at the time was the great foreign and domestic issue for the British – who spent an enormous amount of capital and the lives of hundreds of their sailors pursuing it – and Sierra Leone might be said to have been only a collateral outcome of that venture. I find the humanitarian motive entirely plausible. The British anti-slavery effort was the first ever such effort in history; no other slave-owning nation had bothered to give the issue any moral consideration before, from the classical world to that point. "We have seen something unprecedented in history," the great French humanist Alexis de Tocqueville wrote of the British

abolition of slavery at the time, “slavery abolished, not by the desperate effort of the slave, but by the enlightened will of the master...Open the annals of all peoples, and I doubt whether you will find anything finer or more extraordinary.”

Sierra Leone’s foundational principles, then, were not at all based on violence: they were based on enlightened and humane principles, though in practice those principles were from time to time betrayed or compromised.

In making the claim about the foundational deformity and violence as the origin of the RUF’s nihilism of the 1990s, Wai writes about “the nature of the state and the structures of violence that are constitutive of the state of Sierra Leone from its very moment of conception as a colonial project, and how the nature and pattern of that violence continues to structure everyday power relations and exercise of power in that country.” This broad statement may be applicable to any country that has had a colonial experience, which is almost any modern country, including Britain, and it therefore cannot provide a valid explanatory framework.

I have gone at length to critique Wai’s book because, though I disagree with its key thesis about the origins of the so-called rebel war, I find it a very important contribution to the debate on Sierra Leone’s recent past. I take it very seriously. I think it should be read very widely, and should provoke debate among the country’s intellectuals. I offer this critique as a starting point for that debate.

## **Something just a little different**

In this section we have selected items that will be of interest to those currently studying Sierra Leone and those who follow us. I am grateful to Ade Daramy and Peter Andersen for their help in developing this section

A little known fact – Flight Officer Hyde – a Murray Town man who joined the Royal Air Force during the Second World War and saw action in ‘The Battle of Britain’ and elsewhere. He later served as a diplomat.

From The London Gazette December 1899 – the search for Bai Bureh – the original account, on behalf of the British Military Force of the search for and the eventual capture of Bai Bureh

## **Sierra Leone**

The name of Sierra Leone Peter Andersen – a look, in Peter’s own style at just how Sierra Leone might have acquired its name

A nation's history does not reside alone, and sometimes primarily, within its borders. Bits and pieces of the historical narrative, the events which forge relations between states and which in turn influence the flow of world events, too often reside in dusty archives and forgotten manuscripts, in other countries on other continents, and even in languages not easily accessible to local scholars.

Accounts of Sierra Leone's first contacts with European navigators and traders are likely to be found in the archives of Portugal and Italy (and later Britain), written in Portuguese, Italian – or, since the political and linguistic unification of Italy dates only from the nineteenth century, possibly in the Genoese dialect. We need to look to Portugal and Britain for important clues to Sierra Leone's colonial relations with those two states. Documents relating to the slave trade, or to Sierra Leone's participation in two world wars, or the independence movement, are as likely to be documented in Europe and North America as in Freetown.

In the past, these materials have often not been easily accessible to scholars, and the work of historians has suffered as a result. Today this has begun to change, with the internet, the digitization of archives and Google's scanning of books in libraries around the world. There is still a long way to go before a researcher in Freetown can access these materials, but it is important that this be done. This is not only for Sierra Leoneans to write their history from the viewpoint of Sierra Leoneans and not Europeans or Americans or Asians, but also that at certain junctures in history, Sierra Leoneans have influenced the histories of nations far beyond the coast of Africa. But controlling the narrative of history, drawing from the international archives, can start closer to home.

In about 1462<sup>11</sup> Portuguese sea captain Pedro de Cintra, a member of the household of King Alfonso V<sup>12</sup> (who had died in 1458 and succeeded by Dom Henrique or “Prince Henry the Navigator), sailed from the new Portuguese colony of Santiago in Cape Verde<sup>13</sup> (discovered in 1456 by the explorer Cadamosto) in two caravels<sup>14</sup> to chart a section of the African coast between the Rio Geba and the Bay of Santa Maria das Neves (St. Mary of the Snow). He was not the first Portuguese sailor to pass the coast of present-day Sierra Leone – that had happened in 1446 during the reign of Alfonso V. Nor was Freetown the only topographical feature de Cintra charted. Others, described by McMurdo and others, include the Rio Bessegue, forty miles south of Geba, a number of rivers both north and south of Sierra Leone, the Cabo Ledo, which the English later renamed Cape Sierra Leone, and the Selvagens Islands. These were later called the Bravas and corrupted to its present name – Banana Island. De Cintra also named the Islands of Bancos, which later were renamed the Turtle Islands.

De Cintra did not name the country Sierra Leone. He named the mountainous topography of present-day Freetown “Serra Lyôa,” which is usually (and at least in part incorrectly) rendered “Lion Mountain.” The Portuguese word “Serra”, cognate with the English word “serrated,” means a mountain range as opposed to an individual mountain. “Lyôa”, rendered as “Leoa,” is usually translated as “lioness” rather than “lion,” and that appears to be the sense of the name in modern Portuguese (Serra Leoa) and in Spanish (Sierra Leona). Peter Edward Russell<sup>15</sup>, speculates that “Lyôa” is the feminine adjectival form of leão (lion) rather than the noun leoa (lioness), although he acknowledges the continuing controversy.

The question then arises as to the derivation of the name. There is no lack of, mostly unsupported and unfootnoted, speculation: the mistaken belief that the coast abounded in lions, or that the hills resembled a lion, or a group of lions, or that thunder rolling through the hills sounded like lions roaring.

While modern books often report “it is said” that Sierra Leone was so-named because the coastal mountains resemble lions, I have so far failed to find any contemporaneous account which backs this up. Several accounts, such as one by Charles Raymond Beazley<sup>16</sup> cite (or fail to cite) the pilot of the Villa do Conde when he wrote that “Pedro went six hundred miles into the Bight of Benin, passed a mountain range called Sierra Leone from the lion-like growl of the thunder on its summits, and turned back near the point afterwards known as Fort La Mina (1461). Beazley fails to add that this was the pilot's observation, not de Cintra's. The Geographical Journal, Vol. 9 (of

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11 The actual year is uncertain. According to McMurdo, “A fixed date cannot be assigned to the voyage, but it is probable that it took place in 1462, and certainly must have taken place between 1460 and 1463, because we know it was effected after the death of Infante D. Henrique, on 13<sup>th</sup> November, 1460, and previous to the departure of Cadamosto to Italy, on 1<sup>st</sup> February, 1463.”

12 McMurdo, Edward, *The History of Portugal, from the Reign of D. Diniz to the Reign of D. Alfonso V*, published in 1889 by Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington (London). McMurdo draws on an account of the voyage in Portuguese by Luiz de Cadamosto.

13 Utting, Francis Arthur James, “The Story of Sierra Leone,” Longmans, Green & Co. [London and New York], 1931; Ayer Publishing, 1971.

14 A small, generally three-masted sailing ship equipped with a lateen sail which allowed it to tack against the prevailing southwest winds which blow along the West African coast.

15 Russell, Peter Edward, “Prince Henry ‘The Navigator’: A Life (Yale University Press, 2001)

16 Beazley, Charles Raymond, “Prince Henry the Navigator,” G. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1895.

1897) makes this clear. “The pilot of Villa do Conde...speaks of the thundering storms of Serra Leôa, but does not say that its name was derived therefrom.”

The Geographical Journal quotes Duarte Pacheco Pereira, who in his “Esmeraldo de Situ orbis” (published in 1505) the following: “Many think that this land was called Serra Lyoa on account of the existence of lions, but that is not true, for Pedro de Sintra (sic.), who, by command of the Infante Dom Henrique, whose knight he was, discovered it, called it “Lioness” for its wild and rugged appearance (aspera e brava), and not for any other reason; this must be taken for certain, as he himself told it to me.”

This is disputed by Russell, who says in a footnote<sup>17</sup>, “It seems unlikely that Pedro de Sintra (sic.), the inventor of the toponym Cape Ledo, can have so described the appearance of the lush mountains of Sierra Leone. It is possible that the region was named because the Portuguese encountered it at the beginning of the entry of Leo into the zodiacal constellation.”


Russell is apparently saying that de Cintra, whose names were somewhat pedestrian, lacked the imagination to come up with a colourful name evoking lions. He falls back on “it is possible,” to join the “it is said” and “den say.”

With the research tools now emerging, we must not do likewise.

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17 Russell, Peter Edward, “Prince Henry 'The Navigator': A Life (Yale University Press, 2001)

RAF-080109 11/1/68 WASHINGTON: A reception was held at the British Embassy 11/1 to celebrate the 50th birthday of the Royal Air Force. Here, three survivors of the Battle of Britain reminisce their exploits during the war. LTR: Air Vice Marshal Denis Crowley-Milling, the Embassy's Air Attache; Sierra Leone Amb. Idesanya K. Nyds; and Capt. William Taylor, one of two Americans believed to have survived the Battle. UPI TELEPHOTO dl/jf



"Blonde," Mr. W. W. Hardwick, Chief Engineer  
Her Majesty's ship "Blonde."

I have, &c.

F. CARDEW, Governor.

The Right Honourable J. Chamberlain, M.P.,  
&c. &c. &c.

From Colonel Woodgate, Commanding Troops,  
to His Excellency the Governor and Com-  
mander-in-Chief.

*Sierra Leone,*

*January 9, 1899.*

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report to Your Excel-  
lency on the operations undertaken during the  
past year in the suppression of rebellion in the  
Protectorate of Sierra Leone:

From the commencement of the year 1898  
gatherings of armed natives were reported in many  
parts of the country, ostensibly to resist a hut tax,  
but not confined to those districts in which it had  
recently been imposed.

In the Karene District they were headed by  
Bai Bureh, a petty chief, but a man of influence  
and ability, and culminated on the 18th February  
in his successfully resisting arrest by a small  
body of the Sierra Leone Frontier Police, while  
the District Commissioner, Captain Sharpe,  
received warning that the insurgents would attack  
his station at Karene, which was not constructed  
for defence by a small party.

The force at his disposal consisted of 75  
Frontier Police and 25 Armed Messengers, the  
latter not highly trained. To enable him to  
utilize all his men in the district it was decided  
to send troops from Free Town to occupy Karene.

Accordingly Major Norris, 1st West India  
Regiment, was sent with his company (92 Non-  
Commissioned Officers and men) a 7-pr. gun and  
a Maxim and 30 days' supply.

Leaving Free Town on the 24th he disembarked  
at Robat on the Great Sarcies River on the  
26th and reached Karone unopposed on the  
28th February.

At Karene, learning that the natives were  
openly hostile, he applied (by carrier pigeon) for  
more troops (2 Companies to hold Port Lokko  
and Karene, and a third for offensive operations);  
and on the 3rd March, leaving 20 of his men at  
Karene, marched with the remainder and 20  
police to Port Lokko to secure it as a base of  
operations.

He met with resistance on the road, casualties  
2 Officers 8 rank and file and 12 carriers wounded.

On the evening of the 5th a second company  
1st West India Regiment reached Port Lokko,  
where during the day the natives had made a  
desultory attack, in consequence of which a  
portion of the town known as Old Port Lokko had  
been partially destroyed by shell fire.

An entrenched camp was formed at the Church  
Missionary Society's Station outside the town.

The continued resistance of the insurgents  
under Bai Bureh, aided by neighbouring chiefs,  
necessitated further reinforcements being sent  
from Free Town, until by the end of April all the  
available infantry of the garrison were in the  
Karene District.

During the month of March operations were  
mainly confined to the provisioning of Port Lokko,  
Karene (25 miles distant), and two intermediate  
posts, Romani and Kágbantama; and during the  
marches of convoys many casualties occurred,  
chiefly among the carriers, by the fire from stockades  
constructed near the roadside in the dense  
bush through which it passes.

The only offensive movement undertaken was

by Major Buck, 1st West India Regiment, who  
with his company traversed a considerable portion  
of the hostile district, and, after four days' march-  
ing and fighting, reached Karene. Casualties 2  
killed and 10 wounded.

From Karene he patrolled constantly, attacking  
hostile bodies and destroying stockades, with the  
result that the enemy soon ceased to give serious  
trouble in that immediate neighbourhood. In  
these operations he was materially aided by Major  
Tarbet, Commanding the Frontier Police.

On the 1st April Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall,  
1st West India Regiment, arrived at Port Lokko,  
and took command in the district. Having  
established his depôts, he organized a Flying  
Column and took the offensive, destroying hostile  
strongholds throughout the disturbed district,  
which, owing to improved tactics, was accom-  
plished with slight loss, and by the middle of May  
there was but little resistance. Insurgent chiefs  
were still at large and defiant, but appear to have  
been deserted by their allies from other parts.

Meanwhile, in March, affairs became disturbed  
in the adjoining district of Ronietta. In Kwaia  
traffic had been stopped on the Rokell River.

Consequently Major Moore, the Acting District  
Commissioner, proceeded there on the 3rd from  
Songo Town with 40 Frontier Police. He  
returned on the 7th March, having, it was  
thought, suppressed the disturbances. They  
broke out again, however, in April, when Captain  
Fairlough, D.S.O., 4th Dublin Fusiliers, who  
had taken over charge of the District, proceeded  
there with 50 Frontier Police and a force of  
Friendly Natives, and effectually quieted it. He  
met with considerable opposition, losing 4  
Friendlies killed and 6 wounded.

On the 27th April a party of 25 Frontier  
Police under Captain Wallis were suddenly  
attacked at Rañbia on the Small Bum River.  
The insurgents were in great numbers, and having  
gallantly held his own until the ammunition was  
nearly exhausted, Captain Wallis withdrew by  
boat during the night to Bonthe.

This attack was coincident with a general rising  
throughout the Mendi District between the Ribbi  
and Mano Rivers, a distance of 150 miles; em-  
bracing the Imperri, Panguma, Bandajuma and  
Ronietta districts. Massacres of English-speak-  
ing people ensued, including seven American  
missionaries, one gentleman and four ladies at  
Rotofunk, one gentleman and his wife at Thíama,  
and several hundreds of natives, while all store-  
houses and factories in the disturbed area were  
plundered and destroyed.

All communication with the District Commis-  
sioners and detachments of police in the Ronietta,  
Bandajuma, and Pangoma districts was cut off;  
Bonthe, the sea-port of the Mendi country, was  
threatened with immediate attack, and Sierra  
Leone itself was thought to be in danger.

To meet this, without suspending Lieutenant-  
Colonel Marshall's operations in the Karene  
district, there were available a garrison battery  
of 30 Europeans and 70 natives, a few details of  
the 1st West India Regiment—Bandmen and  
men sent in sick from Port Lokko, but again fit  
for service, 150 of the newly-raised West African  
Regiment, recruited mainly from the two rebel  
tribes, Jimani and Mendi, the Officer for which  
had just arrived with me from England, and a  
few frontier police, including their last joined  
recruits.

Her Majesty's ships "Fox," "Blonde," and  
"Alecto" were in the harbour of Sierra Leone.

To secure Bonthe 50 of the 1st West India  
Regiment and 20 police under Captain Dawkins,



Northumberland Fusiliers, were dispatched at once, and steps were taken to withdraw 100 of the 3rd West India Regiment, two companies of which had arrived during the month from St. Helena, and were at Port Lokko.

These proceeded to Bonthe on the 3rd May with Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, D.S.O., of the Sherwood Foresters and West African Regiment.

His instructions were to secure Bonthe and relieve the District Commissioner's station at Bandajuma.

Volunteer corps were formed at Free Town and Songo Town, both of which were said to be threatened; a small force of regular troops under Major Kennedy occupied the latter place, and steps were taken for the immediate protection of Free Town, in which there is a considerable Mendi population.

Her Majesty's ships "Blonde" and "Alecto" proceeded to Bonthe with the troops.

Two days later, the immediate danger having passed, the special precautions in Free Town were relaxed, and the town resumed its ordinary aspect.

Preparations were next made for the relief of Kwalu, headquarters of the Ronietta district, which had been twice attacked by insurgents, who assembled at Taiama, a large stockaded town 20 miles distant from it.

I accompanied the Column, consisting of 13 European and 20 native gunners, with a 7-pr. 25 1st West India Regiment, 30 Frontier Police, and 100 West African Regiment, which, starting from Songo Town on the 12th May, reached Rotofunk, after two slight skirmishes, on the 14th.

There it halted for several days, having learned that at the Kwalu garrison had repulsed an attack and was safe for the time, cleared the country round, and collected supplies of which it was but poorly provided, carriers not being obtainable then in Sierra Leone, owing, it was said, to recent losses among those in the Karene district.

It reached Kwalu on the 22nd May, and on the 24th, aided by Captain Fairtlough's Yonni allies, attacked and captured Taiama, a large stockaded town, and the following day destroyed others in the neighbourhood, with very slight loss, after which the column returned to Free Town, leaving a small garrison of the West African Regiment at Rotofunk, and a supply of ammunition and a 7-pr. gun at Kwalu.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, having organized a column at Bonthe, proceeded on the 9th May up the Jong R. in boats, towed by the steam-cutter of Her Majesty's ship "Blonde," meeting with some resistance.

He disembarked at Bopor, and on the 17th reached Mafwe, where, on the 19th, he was attacked in force, defeating the insurgents with heavy loss.

From Mafwe he detached columns, one of which, under Lieutenant Safford, 3rd West India Regiment, relieved Bandajuma on the 22nd. The same officer, with a party of 50 West Indians, attacked later and destroyed the stockaded town of Badesuma, while a similar detachment, under Lieutenant Russell, of the 1st Battalion, captured and destroyed Bompe Mendi, the principal Mendi stronghold in that district, and the centre where the rising was arranged. In this action Lieutenant Russell was twice wounded.

At the time of the outbreak, Bandajuma, the District Commissioner's headquarters, was held only by 21 Frontier Police under Captain Eames, Captain Carr (King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry), the Commissioner being away with

the other 30 men. Hearing of the rebellion he hurried back, covering the last 43 miles in 22 hours, and reached his station in time to take part in its defence, an attack having been made at 2.30 A.M. on the 4th May. This was successfully repulsed, also another on the 7th.

After this, with the aid of some friendly Chiefs, Captain Carr was able to clear the country round for a considerable distance, but was cut off from other posts until relieved by Lieutenant Safford when his supplies were running short.

But for his promptitude Bandajuma might have fallen, and it is due to the energy shown by him and Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, and the officers under him, that this formidable rising of a tribe, reputed the most warlike in the Protectorate, was quickly suppressed with slight loss by a few police and troops, many of whom had been but recently enlisted.

Kwalu and Bandajuma having been made secure troops were available for the relief of the distant Commissioner's post at Pangoma, from which no news had been received for nearly six weeks.

On the 9th June Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham dispatched from Bandajuma 45 Frontier Police and a contingent of friendly natives under Captain Eames, and on the 10th Captain Fairtlough started from Kwalu for the same object with 50 Police and a contingent of Yonnis.

During his absence Kwalu was held by a detachment of the West African Regiment under Captain Crofton Atkins, Sherwood Foresters.

The first-named column failed in its object owing to losses sustained by the allies at a place called Doidu. Both they and the carriers refused to advance further, and the police, encumbered with wounded, returned to Bandajuma.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham then dispatched 50 of the West Indians and some Police under Captain Woodman, 3rd West India Regiment. These, moving by a fresh route, reached Pangoma unopposed on the 27th June, left there ammunition, provisions, and the police detachment, and returned to Bandajuma with the West Indians.

The garrison under Captain Blakeney, the Commissioner, were well, but had been more or less closely invested by insurgents for several weeks.

Captain Fairtlough reached Pangoma on the 23rd June, four days before Captain Woodman, having met with much opposition, the insurgents offering at times considerable resistance, constructing stockades, and blocking his road with felled trees. In his advance he captured Tungea and other stockaded towns, and forced the passage of the broad Schwa River. He was ably assisted by Captain Ferguson, 4th Battalion Norfolk Regiment, Commanding the police detachment, particularly at Moindu, where, to get boats for the remainder, he crossed the Schwa River in the face of the enemy on a small raft carrying six policemen.

After attacking and dispersing three separate bodies of insurgents round Pangoma, Captain Fairtlough returned by a fresh route to Kwalu, again fighting most of the way, and reached it on the 9th July. His losses during the month's operations were 3 Friendlies killed and 2 drowned crossing rivers; 6 Frontier Police, 4 Armed Messengers, and 22 Friendlies wounded.

The distance marched was 180 miles; the rainy season was at its worst, rivers flooded and ordinary streams broad swamps.

After the relief of Pangoma disturbances ceased throughout the Mendi country, though some Chiefs maintained a threatening attitude for a time about Woroma on the Moa River.

During July small punitive expeditions were, with the assistance of the Royal Navy, landed to operate in the coast districts between Sierra Leone and Sherbore. Captain White, Her Majesty's ship "Tartar," conveyed a party of Frontier Police who aided friendly natives in clearing of insurgents the country between the Suliema and Mano Rivers, while parties of the West African Regiment under Captains Goodwyn and Carleton were landed and did good service at Shenge and on the Bumpe River, and between those places and Kwalu.

During July and August Major Ryde operating from Bonthe, where his half battalion (four companies 3rd West India Regiment) was stationed, did good service in the Bendu and Imperri districts.

Turning to the Karene district. In July, the rains having made movements almost impossible, the bulk of the 1st West India Regiment was withdrawn to Free Town, leaving small garrisons at Port Lokko and Karene.

In August these were supplemented by two companies of West Africans under Captain Marescaux, Shropshire Light Infantry, who took command in the district, and did good service in aiding the Commissioner to restore order.

Early in October it became necessary to withdraw the West Indians to Free Town.

They were replaced by three companies West African Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, and the rains having subsided active operations were resumed for the capture of the rebel leaders.

Of these, Alimami Lahai, the most influential next to Bai Bureh, surrendered to Captain Robinson, of the Frontier Police, who for some time had pursued him closely.

Captain Goodwyn, with two companies of West Africans, was placed in the heart of Bai Bureh's country, and gave the rebels no peace until that chief was captured after many minor skirmishes on the 11th November by a party under his immediate command.

At the same time Captain Carleton, King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment, with a West African Company, operated against Bai Forki east of Port Lokko, in a district which had been previously but little visited. He was hampered by being twice called off to be in readiness for other duties, but succeeded in dispersing the rebels, and Bai Forki, deserted by his followers, surrendered shortly after to the District Commissioner.

The capture of these chiefs brought the rebellion to a close. The natives appear to be returning to their usual occupations, and peace seems to have been restored throughout the Karene, Ronietta, and Mendi districts.

Our losses during these operations have been:—*Imperial Troops*.—4 Officers and 17 Non-Commissioned Officers and men killed or mortally wounded, 14 Officers and 94 Non-Commissioned Officers and men wounded.

*Frontier Police*.—46 Non-Commissioned Officers and men killed or mortally wounded, 4 Officers and 72 Non-Commissioned Officers and men wounded.

*Carriers*.—90 killed and 56 wounded.

Of the above the troops lost in the Karene district alone, 3 Officers, 8 Non-Commissioned Officers and men killed, 8 Officers and 61 Non-Commissioned Officers and men wounded. The Police lost in that district 1 man killed, 3 Officers and 32 Non-Commissioned Officers and men wounded out of a total strength of 75. Most of the casualties occurred in the early stages of the

operations. The large number of Police killed is due to the number of detachments that were overpowered at the outbreak of disturbances.

The friendly levies at times lost considerably, but, save in the few cases I have mentioned, I have no record of their casualties.

The gallant example of the District Commissioners in maintaining, until relieved, the important stations of Kwalu, Bandajuma, and Pangoma, and the obedience and courage of their men saved the Colony the cost of extensive operations, which would have been necessary for reconquest of the Protectorate had those places fallen.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging the valuable aid we have received from time to time from the Royal Navy, from Captain Compton, Commanding the Colonial Steamer "Countess of Derby," Mr. Bradford, and others employed on the Colonial Railway, Mr. Parkes, the Secretary for Native Affairs and other Officers of the Colonial Government, of the Volunteers who enrolled themselves for defence of Free Town and Songo Town, also of the English ladies of Port Lokko Mission Station, who kindly tended our sick and wounded.

I have, &c.,  
E. WOODGATE, Colonel,  
Commanding Troops.

The following is a list of those Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers whose conduct appears to be deserving of special mention:—

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel G. G. Cunningham, D.S.O., Derbyshire Regiment, West African Regiment.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. A. Marshall, West India Regiment.

Captain N. J. Goodwyn, Devonshire Regiment, West African Regiment.

Captain F. M. Carleton, Royal Lancaster Regiment, West African Regiment.

Major C. B. Morgan, West India Regiment.

Lieutenant H. D. Russell, West India Regiment.

Major A. H. Thomas, Army Service Corps.

Major R. Crofts, Royal Army Medical Corps.

Lieutenant W. R. Howell, 1st Glamorganshire Volunteer Artillery, Sierra Leone Volunteers.

Captain H. G. de L. Ferguson, 4th Battalion Norfolk Regiment, Sierra Leone Frontier Police.

Captain E. C. D'H. Fairtlough, D.S.O., 4th Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, District Commissioner, Sierra Leone Protectorate.

Captain W. S. Sharpe, 4th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, District Commissioner, Sierra Leone Protectorate.

Major A. F. Tarbet, 3rd Battalion South Lancashire Regiment, Inspector-General, Sierra Leone Frontier Police.

Major A. R. Stuart, Royal Artillery, Commanding Royal Artillery.

Major E. S. C. Kennedy, West India Regiment, Brigade Major.

Major H. C. Buck, West India Regiment.

Lieutenant H. T. Eckersley, West India Regiment.

Lieutenant N. E. F. Safford, West India Regiment.

Captain O. H. E. Marescaux, Shropshire Light Infantry, West African Regiment.

Captain C. Dalton, Royal Army Medical Corps.

Captain J. M. Harrison, Army Service Corps.

Corporal Greenidge, 1st Battalion West India Regiment.

Private Grant, 3rd Battalion West India Regiment.

Sergeant A. G. Wells, Army Service Corps.  
Sergeant B. Thomas, West African Regiment.

*Chancery of the Royal Victorian Order,  
St. James's Palace, December 26, 1899.*

THE Queen has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following promotion in the Royal Victorian Order:

To be an Honorary Commander of the said Royal Order, viz. :—

Herr Reinhold Klehmet, M.V.O.

*Foreign Office, December 28, 1899.*

THE Queen has been pleased, by Letters Patent under the Great Seal, dated 28th December, 1899, to revoke the Royal Charter dated 10th July, 1886, granted to the Royal Niger Company Chartered and Limited, then the National African Company Limited.

*Downing Street, December 28, 1899.*

THE Queen has been pleased, by Letters Patent, dated 21st instant, passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, to further amend the Letters Patent dated 16th September 1885, altering the Constitution of the Council of Government of the Colony of Mauritius, and to revoke and embody in the new Letters Patent the provisions contained in the Letters Patent dated 3rd September 1894, and 4th June 1896, respectively, amending the said Letters Patent of the 16th September 1885.

*War Office, November 8, 1899.*

THE Queen has been pleased to issue a new Commission of Lieutenancy for the City of London, constituting and appointing the several persons undermentioned to be Her Majesty's Lieutenants within the said City, viz. :—The Right Honourable Sir John Voce Moore, Knt., Lord Mayor of our city of London, and the Lord Mayor of our said city for the time being; Our trusty and well-beloved Sir John Whittaker Ellis, Bart., Sir Henry Edmund Knight, Knt., Colonel Sir Reginald Hanson, Sir Joseph Savory, Barts., Sir David Evans, K.C.M.G., Sir Joseph Renals, Bart., Sir Walter Henry Wilkin, K.C.M.G., Sir George Faudel Faudel-Phillips, Bart., K.C.I.E., Colonel Sir Horatio David Davies, K.C.M.G., Aldermen of our city of London; Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor Sir Charles Hall, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Recorder of our city of London, and the Recorder of our said city for the time being; Our trusty and well-beloved Alfred James Newton, Frank Green, Esqrs., Sir Joseph Cockfield Dimsdale, Sir Marcus Samuel, Sir James Thompson Ritchie, Knits., John Pound, Walter Vaughan Morgan, William Purdie Treloar, John Charles Bell, George Wyatt Truscott, Frederick Prat Alliston, Samuel Green, Esqrs., Sir John Knill, Bart., Thomas Vezey Strong, Henry George Smallman, Thomas Boor Crosby, Esqrs., Aldermen of our city of London, and the Aldermen of our said city for the time being; Our trusty and well-beloved Sir William James Richmond Cotton, Knt., Chamberlain of our city of London, and the Chamberlain of our said city for the time being; Our trusty and well-beloved Sir John Braddick Monckton, Knt., Town Clerk

of our city of London, and the Town Clerk of our said city for the time being; Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Forrest Fulton, Knt., Q.C., Common Serjeant of our city of London, and the Common Serjeant of our said city for the time being; Our trusty and well-beloved George Pepler, Frederick Cox, Edward Eyre Ashby, John Edward Walford, James Norris Pimm, James Wallinger Goodinge, James George White, Frederick Dadswell, William Thornburgh Brown, Joseph Snowden, George Harris Haywood, Esqrs., Sir Robert Hargreaves Rogers, Knt., Robert Parker Taylor, Andrew Bowring, Henry Hodsoll Heath, John Greenwood, William Charles Simmons, Pearsé Morrison, John Last Sayer, George Noah Johnson, Samuel Parnwell, William Malthouse, Thomas John Woodrow, Frederick Stanley, Lewis Michael Myers, Joseph Barrett, Samuel Weingott, Frederick William Pursell, John James Baddeley, William Henry Pannell, Esqrs., Deputies of our city of London, and the Deputies of our said city for the time being; Our trusty and well-beloved Sir Sydney Hedley Waterlow, Bart., James Ebenezer Saunders, Esq., Sir Henry Aaron Isaacs, Knt., Sir Andrew Lusk, Sir James Whitehead, Barts., formerly Aldermen of our city of London; Our trusty and well-beloved William George Barnes, William Cave Fowler, George Sims, Robert William Scobell, Gabriel Lindo, John Thomas Bedford, Whinfield Hora, James Lewis Dowling, Esqrs., formerly Deputies of our city of London; Our trusty and well-beloved James Pattison Currie, Benjamin Buck Greene, Henry Riversdale Grenfell, Esqrs.; Our right trusty and well-beloved Henry Hucks, Lord Aldenham; Our trusty and well-beloved John Saunders Gilliat, Charles Hermann Goschen, Esqrs.; Sir Mark Wilks Collet, Bart.; Albert George Sandeman, Hugh Colin Smith, Esqrs.; Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor William Lidderdale; Our trusty and well-beloved Herbert Brooks, Everard Alexander Hambro, Samuel Steuart Gladstone, Augustus Prevost, Samuel Hope Morley, Charles George Arbuthnot, Henry Cosmo Orme Bonsor, William Middleton Campbell, Alexander Falconer Wallace, Esqrs.; Frederick Huth Jackson, Reginald Eden Johnston, Alfred Clayton Cole, Walter Cuniffe, Robert Lydston Newman, Esqrs.; Our right trusty and well-beloved John, Lord Revelstoke; Our right trusty and well-beloved Evelyn Hubbard, commonly called the Honourable Evelyn Hubbard, Edgar Lubbock, William Douro Hoare, Henry Jeffreys Bushby, William Hughes-Hughes, Cornelius Lea Wilson, William Fowler Mountford Copeland, Bonamy Dobree, William Henry Challis, Edward Masterman, John Francis Moon, Stephen William Silver, John William Carter, Esqrs.; Lieutenant-Colonel Travers Barton Wire, Sir Joseph Sebag-Montefiore, Knt., James Duke Hill, Edward Howley Palmer, Esqrs.; Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor George Joachim Goschen; Our right trusty and well-beloved Nathaniel Meyer, Lord Rothschild; Our trusty and well-beloved Charles John Todd, Francis Augustus Bevan, Henry Alers Hankey, Robert Malcolm Kerr, Percy Shawe Smith, Alfred Charles de Rothschild, Esqrs., Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred James Copeland, William Sedgwick Saunders, M.D., William Collinson, George Croshaw, Esqrs.; Our right trusty and well-beloved Councillor Sir John Lubbock, Bart.; Our trusty and well-beloved Charles William Cookworthy Hutton, Francis Tagart, Esqrs., Sir Edwin Durning Lawrence, Bart., Samuel Henry Faudel-Phillips, Oswald Augustus Smith, Eric Carrington Smith, John Fenwick Fenwick, James Lionel Ridpath,